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1. Introduction
The eld of empirical industrial organization uses data to analyze the structure of
industries in the economy by measuring the parameters that drive the behaviors of
rms and consumers in these industries.
Part of the literature focuses on markets in which rms interact in an imperfectly
competitive setting. Research in this eld heavily relies on models with a game-theoretic
foundation. Starting from the seminal work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b), many mar-
ket structure models endogenize the number of rms entering a market. Not only
industries but also other types of organizations operate through interactions among
their members and can be analyzed with analogous game-theoretic models. The un-
derlying hypothesis is that agents making a certain decision receive a non-negative
payo, conditional on the expectations or actions of other (potential and actual) agents
acting in the same environment.
These considerations have been crucial in shaping the rst two self-contained chap-
ters of this dissertation. In the rst chapter, I study the workers’ decisions of joining
teams within an important scientic experiment. In the second chapter, joint with Laura
Grigolon, we provide empirical evidence of the link between common ownership and
rms’ decisions of entering markets in the Ontarian cancer drug industry.
The fact that decision-makers operating in a strategic environment have in expec-
tation non-negative payos is parallel to revealed preference arguments at the basis
of discrete choice models of consumer behavior. As in the market entry literature,
consumers’ choices are interpreted as revealing something about an underlying latent
utility. By observing how consumers’ decisions change, as their choice sets and market
conditions change, one can gain insight into the underlying determinants of consumers’
preferences. In the third chapter, joint with Liana Jacobi and Michelle Sovinsky, we
analyze the potential complementaritarities in consumption of the so-called sin goods
(marijuana, alcohol and tobacco) taking into account persistence in behavior.
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For the development of this dissertation, I rely on rigorous descriptive analyses and
the development and estimation of structural models. With these approaches, it is
possible to give informed assessments to policy-makers and in the case of structural
models to quantify the impact of feasible policy changes.
Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I present an empirical structural model that quanties the
main drivers of endogenous team formation and team performance when the allocation
of individuals to teams is decentralized.
Many companies currently adopt decentralized approaches to production. These
arrangements are widespread in scientic institutions, as fellow researchers typically
collaborate on a voluntary basis. The emergence of such arrangements poses several
challenges to an economist. First, it is important to understand which elements drive
the decision to join projects. Second, it becomes critical to develop tools to correctly
measure the performance of teams when the decision to participate in projects is en-
dogenous. These steps are fundamental to assess if decentralization is desirable to
obtain successful outcomes with a larger probability.
To address these challenges, I use unique data from Virgo, an international collabo-
rative experiment in science. Researchers involved in Virgo choose which project(s) to
work on. For the analysis, I use the information on projects’ characteristics, outcomes,
and participants.
I develop and estimate an entry game with incomplete information where hetero-
geneous agents decide simultaneously whether to join a project (à la Aguirregabiria
and Mira, 2007). The payo of joining depends on exogenous project characteristics,
including a measure of ex-ante quality, and the expectation on the actions of potential
project-mates. Strategic complementarities and substitutabilities can arise in this set-
ting as workers might nd benecial or detrimental to work with others. I measure
project outcome in terms of probability of project completion.
I nd that the pool of expected project-mates drives the decision to join a project
while project quality is less important. The larger the pool, the lower the probability of
joining a project, as a consequence of the congestion eect due to increasing coordina-
tion and communication costs. Heterogeneity in researchers’ characteristics explains
the selection into projects. I show that controlling for both projects’ ex-ante quality and
2
endogenous project participation matters for obtaining unbiased estimates of teams’
performance.
Finally, I consider a counterfactual centralized mechanism in which strategic inter-
actions have no value. I nd that this alternative allocation leads to excessive project
participation and decreases the probability of project completion. Hence, adopting
a decentralized mechanism of project allocation within a rm can be more ecient
because workers internalize the costs and benets of working with each other.
Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, joint with Laura Grigolon, we document the features of a
highly innovative industry characterized by a concentrated ownership structure, the
Ontarian cancer drug industry. The analysis has the objective of studying the eect of
common ownership on the decision of generic producers to enter the market.
Common ownership, namely the practice for large institutional investors of owning
stakes in competing rms, has raised the attention of antitrust scholars because the
degree of common ownership grew in recent years. Some empirical studies show that
it has a large eect on the strategic behavior of companies held by institutional share-
holders. Common ownership linkages are a well-established feature of many industries,
including the cancer drug industry, for which hospital and public drug program spend-
ing in Ontario is dramatically increasing over time. These factors make it an appealing
setting to understand the consequences of the common ownership phenomenon.
We use unique data on the timing of cancer drug entry in the market (branded and
generics) and collect information on patents, drug approvals, and drug indications. We
complement our dataset by gathering ownership data mainly from 13F lings. With
these data, we empirically assess the presence of common ownership and quantify
which components mainly drive the link between common ownership and market
entry. In particular, we show that investors’ concentration plays an important role in
dening common ownership in the years before the entry of a generic in the market.
Common ownership may have anticompetitive eects and be harmful to welfare.
With the results of this paper, we make the rst important step in identifying the target
of eventual policy interventions to reduce this practice, for this industry as well as for
other innovative industries characterized by a high level of concentration.
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Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, joint with Liana Jacobi and Michelle Sovinsky, we analyze
the potential complementarities in use when individuals choose to consume bundles
containing marijuana, alcohol, or cigarettes (sin goods), taking into account persistence
in consumption for these substances.
Two-thirds of Americans are in favor of marijuana legalization. This substance,
however, might be consumed in combination with other substances, such as alcohol
and tobacco. Moreover, past use of one of the substances might have consequences
for the consumption of that substance and other sin goods, especially if one considers
complementarity in consumption. Therefore, it is important to understand whether
consuming marijuana aects the consumption of other substances and what changes
when one considers the potentially addictive nature of these products.
We develop and estimate a dynamic model of multi-substance use allowing for
persistence in behavior. For the empirical analysis, we uniquely combine data from
two primary sources. The rst are individual-level panel data from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey, which contains information on demographics and
consumption behaviors of young adolescents in the US. The second source are pricing
data for marijuana, alcohol and cigarettes collected from administrative tax data and
transaction data.
Our parameter estimates show that it is important to account for correlation across
unobservables and persistence in behavior when analyzing the decision of using the
sin goods in combination. Moreover, we nd that the past use of a substance inuences
not only its current use but also the decision of using the substance together with
other substances. Our results provide insightful information on the long-run eect
of marijuana legalization for the concurrent and future consumption of potentially
substitutable products.
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2. “No Man is an Island":
An Empirical Study on Team
Formation and Performance
No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe;
every man is a peece of the
Continent, a part of the maine [...].
John Donne - 1624
2.1. Introduction
Teamwork is a crucial element in determining the success of rms or research insti-
tutions. Over the centuries, the paradigm of working organization has shifted toward
the execution of more specialized tasks, usually assigned to workers in a centralized
fashion. At the same time, the organization of teams is evolving. Many companies and
institutions now adopt decentralized approaches to production, such as open work-
ows and Agile business practices.1,2 As an example, Valve Corporation, one of the US
leading companies in entertainment software and technology, states that open work-
ows are a primary competitive advantage in recruiting and retention: “We’ve heard
that other companies have people allocate a percentage of their time to self-directed
projects. At Valve, that percentage is 100. Since Valve is at, people don’t join projects
because they’re told to. Instead, you’ll decide what to work on after asking yourself the
right questions.” (Valve, Handbook for new employees, page 8). Scientic institutions, in
1Let Employees Choose When, Where, and How to Work, Harvard Business Review, N. Koloc, 2014.
2https://www.agilebusiness.org/page/About
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which researchers often collaborate voluntarily, adopt similar arrangements (Guimera,
Uzzi, Spiro, and Amaral, 2005; Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi, 2007). This evidence naturally
raises many questions: which elements drive the decision to join projects? How can we
measure the performance of teams when the decision to join projects is endogenous?
Is decentralization better for successful outcomes?
I address these questions with a unique dataset from an important collaborative ex-
periment in science, Virgo. The ultimate goal of Virgo is the detection of gravitational
waves, and the founders of the LIGO/Virgo (LIGO is the U.S. counterpart of Virgo)
collaboration were awarded the 2017 Nobel Prize in Physics. Researchers involved in
Virgo choose which project(s) to work on and use an on-line platform to report their
activities. Within this framework, I disentangle the eects that complementarity/sub-
stitutability among researchers and projects’ ex-ante heterogeneity (i.e. project ex-ante
unobserved quality) have on the decision to join a project, controlling for researchers’
and projects’ exogenous characteristics. I show that to correctly assess the performance
of an endogenously formed team one needs to take into account what drives the sorting
of researchers into projects.
The relevance of the analysis is twofold. First, the evaluation of workers’ perfor-
mance is a cornerstone of the literature in organizational economics. As workers’ and
organization’s incentives are usually not aligned, conicts of interest can generate in-
eciencies. Since Holmstrom (1982), the literature on team production has focused on
the analysis of optimal monitoring and incentives for workers, in terms of payment
and career schemes.3 My analysis contributes to this literature by documenting that
a decentralized mechanism of project participation can create misalignment through
another channel: the allocation of workers to projects based on individual preferences.
A large amount of public and private funds is allocated every year to scientic
organizations, which are usually based on decentralized arrangements for project par-
ticipation.4,5 Similarly, within-rm workforce has also evolved toward a more exible
organization system. Hence, it is crucial to take into account individual preferences
related to project participation, especially to understand if a decentralized mechanism
3See (Bolton, Dewatripont, et al., 2005) and (Prendergast, 1999).
4For example, ERC, DFG, NRC, NSF, UK Research Councils grants.
5Recent empirical papers in innovation study the mechanisms behind collaborations and interactions
in the innovation process (Akcigit, Caicedo, Miguelez, Stantcheva, and Sterzi, 2018) and in technical
standards development (Ganglmair, Simcoe, and Tarantino, 2018).
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can improve upon a centralized allocation of workers to projects, and to establish when
a decentralized mechanism is desirable.
Second, endogenous project participation can bias the estimates of the parameters of
interest (e.g. performance, productivity, and eciency) if sorting is neglected. Workers
may sort into projects for reasons that are not observable by the econometrician. The
empirical setting of this paper provides a clean framework to address these issues.
To analyze the drivers of team formation, I develop and estimate an entry game
with incomplete information à la Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) where agents decide
simultaneously whether to join a project. By revealed preference, an agent joins a
project only if its payo from doing so exceeds that from not joining. The former
payo depends on exogenous project characteristics, including a measure of ex-ante
quality, the expectation on potential project-mates’ actions, and a project-agent specic
component. In this setting, strategic complementarities and substitutabilities may arise.
Once agents make their entry decisions, the project is developed and ends with an out-
come. The outcome is a function of dierent (observed and unobserved) characteristics,
including information about other team members.
My main nding is that the pool of expected project-mates drives the decision to join
a project while project quality is of lesser importance. The larger the pool, the lower
the probability of joining a project, because of congestion or increasing coordination
and communication costs (Becker and Murphy, 1992). Heterogeneity in researchers’
characteristics plays an important role in explaining selection into projects. For exam-
ple, senior researchers are more likely to join projects of expected larger size relative to
junior researchers. I show that controlling for projects’ ex-ante quality and endogenous
project participation matters for obtaining unbiased estimates of teams’ performance.
To assess the desirability of a decentralized mechanism, I consider a counterfactual
centralized mechanism in which strategic interactions have no value. I nd that the
new allocation leads to excessive project participation and decreases the probability
of project completion. Hence, a decentralized mechanism of task allocation within a
rm can be more ecient because workers internalize costs and benets of working
together better than a centralized mechanism.
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Starting from the seminal work of Lazear (1998), many papers have studied working
collaborations.6 Empirical works on peer eects analyze group interactions and how
these aect productivity (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2010; Falk and Ichino, 2006;
Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou, 2015; Mas and Moretti, 2009, among others). They
show that co-workers can exert economically signicant eects on their peers, via
channels not explicitly created by the management system, such as social connections
and network eects.
This paper contributes to the studies on working collaborations in several ways.
First, a key challenge in this body of empirical work concerns the identication of
the main determinants of workers’ selection into teams. To address this challenge, I
develop the methodologies used to study rm’s entry decision into markets (see Aguir-
regabiria and Suzuki (2015) for a recent survey of the literature). A crucial dierence
between rms’ and workers’ decisions, however, is that the latter can gain from the
presence of others. This distinction plays an important role in my structural model.
Controlling for the determinants of selection proves to be crucial to correctly evaluate
the performance of teams. Second, to estimate the model, it is important to observe
individuals’ decisions to enter a project, the project’s characteristics, and its outcome.
The data from the Virgo experiment are ideal to obtain this information. At the same
time, with this unique data source, I can analyze the mechanisms behind knowledge
creation in science. Third, using my estimates, I test the eciency of the actual de-
centralized mechanism of researchers’ allocation against a centralized mechanism to
assess whether decentralization is a desirable design of teamwork within organizations.
To my knowledge, this paper is the rst to take a step toward understanding the deter-
minants of decentralized team formation in working collaborations and to assess the
eciency of this mechanism.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, I describe the institutional details
and the data. I discuss the model in Section 3 and the empirical implementation in
Section 4. Results from descriptive regressions and from the full model are presented
in Section 5. I present the counterfactual in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
6For instance, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) argue that teamwork is benecial when there
is specialization and knowledge transfer of information that may be valuable to other team members.
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2.2. Institutional Details and Data Sources
I use unique data from a science experiment named Virgo7, founded by the French
National Center for Scientic Research (Centre National de la Recherche Scientique –
CNRS) and the Italian National Institute for Nuclear Physics (Istituto Nazionale di Fisica
Nucleare – INFN)8 in 1987 and completed in 2003. Virgo is operated in Italy, on the site
of the European Gravitational Observatory (EGO), by an international collaboration
consisting of about 200 people aliated to 20 laboratories all over Europe. Virgo has
two “sisters” in the United States, LIGO Livingston and LIGO Hanford. This joint
collaboration has proven very successful and indeed the founders9 were awarded the
Nobel Prize in Physics in 2017.
Virgo consists of a giant laser interferometer. Interferometers work by merging
two or more sources of light to create an interference pattern, which can be measured
and analyzed. The interference patterns generated by the interferometers contain
information about the object or phenomenon being studied. Virgo studies phenomena
related to gravitational waves. The detection of gravitational waves, predicted by Albert
Einstein’s general relativity, has challenged physicists for over a century. During the
1970s, the discovery of the anomalies in the arrival times of radio pulses, due to a
close neutron star, represented a crucial step toward the gravitational waves detection
because it showed how catastrophic astronomical events can determine ripples in space-
time. In 2015, the merger of two black holes radiated an amount of energy equivalent
to 3.0`´0.5 solar mass in the form of gravitational waves. This event was recorded
by LIGO. Subsequently, other events were recorded also by Virgo.
Building up the laser interferometer requires an incredible amount of resources and
time: this process is divided into intermediate steps, that I dene as macro-projects.
Macro-projects relate to the dierent phases of the development of the experiment: they
could refer to the Infrastructure System of the Interferometer or to the Injection System,
which takes care of the optics of the high power laser.10 Therefore, dierent skills and
knowledge are required depending on the actual task to perform. Macro-projects are
7http://www.virgo-gw.eu/
8National Research Centers in France and Italy.
9“Pioneers Rainer Weiss and Kip S. Thorne, together with Barry C. Barish, the scientist and leader
who brought the project to completion, ensured that four decades of eort led to gravitational waves
nally being observed.”.
10A detailed description of the macro-projects is available upon request.
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then split into smaller tasks which do not compete with each other. I dene them as
projects.
The dataset spans more than 4 years from June 2012 to September 2016). June 2012
is the starting point of a new phase of the experiment (Advanced Virgo) which was
completed in January 2017. Projects were set up in the Technical Design Report in April
2012. The report contains detailed descriptions of the projects and has been edited
as a joint eort of the researchers working in Virgo at that time. Importantly, as the
Report is compiled before Advance Virgo started, the projects are pre-determined and
not designed to tailor specic researchers’ characteristics.
In Virgo, the assignment of projects to researchers happens in a decentralized fash-
ion: each member of the experiment voluntarily decides whether or not to join a certain
project. The only exception holds for new entrants in the experiment; they are usually
students or junior researchers who, during a few weeks at the start of their experience
in Virgo, are exogenously allocated to projects. Researchers are paid a xed wage by
regulated contracts, in line with the respective national collective agreements,11 so their
salary does not depend on the performance. Moreover, because projects are relatively
short lived, there are no long-term monetary or career incentives in joining a particular
project.
The dataset used in the empirical analysis comprises several sources. I web-scrape
information regarding the characteristics of the projects, the nal outcomes of the
projects and the projects’ participants from the Logbook of Virgo. I complement my
dataset by hand-collecting data on researchers’ characteristics (nationality, gender,
level of education, professional seniority) from several on-line sources, mainly personal
websites, available curricula and LinkedIn proles. These are discussed in turn.
2.2.1. The Logbook
Researchers in Virgo communicate using an on-line platform: the Logbook,12 which
consists of web-pages held by project teams. With the advent of new electronic note-
books it has become possible to incorporate valuable information into enterprise-wide
information management systems (McAlpine, Hicks, Huet, and Culley, 2006). The log-
11The agreements may dier among Countries.
12Source: https://tds.ego-gw.it/itf/osl_virgo/index.php
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book allows researchers to record information on working projects and experiences
such as results of measurements, tests, data taking, that describe the results of activities
and tasks, are required for future activities or may be of value in the future. The Log-
book is therefore a meeting platform for project-seeking researchers, who might also
work from dierent locations, and hence it represents a communication platform with
minimal search frictions (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely, 2010). Moreover, researchers
are obliged to report their work on the Logbook. This facilitates monitoring among
researchers, as reports are observable and their content is veriable. Because of these
features, moral hazard or free riding are of limited concern. Furthermore, it is also
unlikely that researchers coordinate beforehand about who is joining projects outside
the on-line platform, as projects are short and coordination would result in observing
long delays in the execution of the projects which are not observed in the data.
Each web-page of the Logbook consists of logs (or entries). A log represents a de-
scription or an update of a project; it is identied by the title of the macro-project and
the project it refers to, the name of the author(s), the time and 89 date, the (chronolog-
ical) number, the main text and possibly images, comments or other les attached. A
screenshot example of a Logbook page is given by gure 2.1. I provide two examples
of projects in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.1.: Example of a Logbook Page
Notes: This web-page consists of two logs belonging to dierent projects. For each log, the rst row
identies the title of the macro-project; the second row identies the name(s) of the project participants,
together with time and day of the log; the third row identies the project; the fourth part identies the
actual text of the project. In this example, the rst is a project with two participants, the second is a
single author project.
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics. The full dataset contains 16 macro-projects
and 2, 243 projects. The average number of logs per project is 1.2: projects usually do
not consist of multiple sequential rounds; this motivates the decision to model joining a
project as a static one. In Appendix B I show the logs distributions per projects. Around
70% are team projects, the rest are solo projects. The maximum observed team size is
10 with an average of 3.09 participants per team.
Mean St. Dev.
Sample period June 12 - Sept. 16
No. of projects (obs) 2,243
No. of macro-projects 16
Logs per project 1.2 0.4
Team projects 71.8% 0.47
Team size 3.09 1.31
Max team size 10
No. of projects with pre-determined teams 152
No. of projects with external companies 71
Table 2.1.: Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of project participants. Projects with two partici-
pants are the most frequent, followed by solo projects.
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Figure 2.2.: Distribution of Project Participants
While project participation is mostly decentralized, in 152 projects (6% of the total
number of projects) there are teams that are exogenously formed or pre-determined
(formed o-line). For those teams, I do not observe the actual participants. Further, I
dened these teams as “pre-determined teams”. In very few projects p72q, there is the
participation of external companies; these companies supply Virgo with instruments
and tools for the lab experiments and help researchers to set up those instruments.
Table 2.2 reports the frequency of the macro-projects in terms of number of projects.
Frequency
Macro-Project 1 305
Macro-Project 2 167
Macro-Project 3 75
Macro-Project 4 170
Macro-Project 5 463
Macro-Project 6 35
Macro-Project 7 18
Macro-Project 8 1
Macro-Project 9 135
Macro-Project 10 85
Macro-Project 11 320
Macro-Project 12 27
Macro-Project 13 59
Macro-Project 14 76
Macro-Project 15 115
Macro-Project 16 192
Total 2,243
Table 2.2.: Frequency of Macro-projects
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In order to determine the nal outcome of a project, I require a quantiable mea-
sure of output. One possibility is to use publications that resulted from the projects.
Unfortunately, this is not a viable option for two reasons. First, not all the projects end
with a publication. Second, in Virgo the general rule is that publications that follow
from a project must contain the names of all Virgo researchers in alphabetical order.13
Therefore I require a less noisy measure. Fortunately, the Logbook comments represent
an important data source for this scope. Depending on how complete a project is, it can
end with dierent outcomes. I examine the text to determine a measure of outcome.
In particular, I classify each text into one of two dierent categories.14 When a project
has more than one log, I only consider the latest one to measure project outcome. The
categories are the following:
0. Describe a problem or a task proposing possible solutions (with no actual inter-
vention); x or understand a problem or perform a task temporarily/partially, do
a measurement still in progress.
1. Fix or understand a problem, perform a task with success, complete or improve
a measurement or survey.
In the sample, 11% of the projects are in class 0 and the rest in class 1. The classied
texts are the measure of project outcome that I use in the empirical estimation. Some
examples can be found in Appendix C.
2.2.2. Researchers’ Characteristics
Virgo consists of 192 researchers. The pool of researchers that collaborate in Virgo
is very heterogeneous. I hand-collect data on their demographic characteristics (na-
tionality, gender, education, professional seniority, eld of research) from several on-
line sources, mainly personal websites, available curricula and LinkedIn proles. Re-
13By checking the research web-pages of some of the researchers in Virgo (for instance, on the
platform https://www.researchgate.net/), it emerges that many publications have above
1, 000 authors.
14I perform robustness checks with three categories. For now, I implement the classication manu-
ally. Initially, I used tools from Supervised Machine Learning (in particular, classication methods) to
determine measures of success. However, this classication proved less fruitful than manual classica-
tion because the jargon of the text is very detailed; therefore any set of features I gave as inputs to the
classiers was not improving the classication.
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searchers can have very dierent backgrounds, work in dierent elds and have dier-
ent nationalities. In order to coherently classify them in terms of professional seniority
and education, I use the information available on the websites of the main European
National Research Centers.15 Figure 2.3 shows the table of conversion for professional
seniority.16
Table of conversion professional seniority
Academia Research Institution (Italy) Research Institution (France) Technical Profession (no degree)
PhD Engineer
Technologist
Ingénieur d’études
Post-doc Post-doctoral fellow
Researcher/Assistant Prof Researcher Ingénieur de recherche Technician
Chargé de Recherche (Technicien d’atelier) Assistant ingénieur
Associate Prof First Researcher First Engineer First technician
Full Prof Director of Research Diriger des Recherches
Director technologist
Table 2.3.: Table of Conversion Professional Seniority
Figure 2.4 provides descriptive statistics of researchers’ demographics. 85% are
male. Around 20% of the researchers in Virgo are juniors, whereas 80% are seniors.17
Not all seniors have a Ph.D.; this is because seniors include technicians that do not
hold a degree or engineers. Not surprisingly, more than 60% are specialized in Physics.
For 18 researchers (around 17% of the total number) I was not able to nd information
online (most likely they are technicians or seniors that do not have an online identity;
for some of them, I only observe their nickname, therefore I am not able to go back to
their original names); they appear in only 93 projects.
15http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-
between-technician-and-technologist, http://www.guide-des-salaires.
com/fonction/technicien-datelier,http://www.cnrs.fr/en/join/
engineer-technician-permanent.htm,https://cadres.apec.fr/Emploi/
Marche-Emploi/Fiches-Apec/Fiches-metiers/Metiers-Par-Categories/
Etudes-recherche-et-developpement/charge-de-recherche,\unskip\
protect\penalty\@M\vrulewidth\z@height\z@depth\dp¸
16When I am not able to nd the professional position, I deduce it from the age, h-index or eld of
research. When two dierent levels of seniority are stated, I take the highest.
17Senior level 1 is the equivalent of Associate Professor in Academia; senior level 2 is comparable to
the denition of Full Professor.
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Frequency
Professional seniority
Juniors 20%
Seniors level 1 63%
Seniors level 2 17%
Field of Research
Physics 61%
Engineering 24%
Others 15%
Other demographics
Males 85%
Italians 58%
With Ph.D. 36%
No. of researchers 174
Table 2.4.: Descriptive Statistics for Researchers
As I will discuss in Section 4, entry models with heterogeneous strategic interactions
are computationally intense. Therefore, I exploit the information on researchers’ demo-
graphic characteristics to reduce the burden of computation of the empirical model. In
particular, I assign each researcher exclusively to a certain type, which is as a combina-
tion of two characteristics: eld of specialization and professional seniority. I simplify
further by aggregating Seniors level 1 and Seniors level 2 together in the category “Se-
niors”, and Engineers and researchers specialized in elds other than Physics in the
category “Other elds”. Following this specication, an example of type is: specialized
in Physics, Junior researcher. Table 2.5 shows the distribution of researchers by types;
table 2.6 shows the number of projects for each type.
# of Researchers
Non-Physics Seniors 65
Non-Physics Juniors 2
Physics Seniors 74
Physics Juniors 33
Non classied 18
Total 192
Table 2.5.: Number of Researchers by Type
# of Projects
Non-Physics Seniors 1,058
Non-Physics Juniors 18
Physics Seniors 1,648
Physics Juniors 485
Non classied 93
Table 2.6.: Number of Projects by Type
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Figure 2.3 shows the distributions of project participation with individuals in the
same level of seniority for Juniors (light yellow bars) and Seniors (dark blue bars). The
frequency with which a junior works with one or more juniors is around 20% and it is
visibly lower than the frequency of a senior working with one or more seniors, around
60%.
Figure 2.3.: Homophily by Professional Seniority
In Appendix B, I show the distributions separately for Non-Physics Seniors and
Physics Seniors. They have similar patterns. From the previous gure, it emerges that
juniors do not frequently work with other juniors, but this does not necessarily imply
that they work alone. Figure 2.4 gives a more comprehensive illustration of the bilateral
project connections among researchers’ types.
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Figure 2.4.: Chord Diagram of Bilateral Project Connections by Types
Notes: The length of the purple arch corresponds to the total number of projects with at least one Physics
Senior (1,648). The length of the pink arch corresponds to the total number of projects with at least one
Physic Junior (485). Likewise for the other types: the green arch is for Non Physics Seniors (1,058) and
the orange arch for Non-Physics Juniors (18). Non-Physics Juniors work in very few projects.
The pink ow that links Physics Juniors and Physics Seniors represents the projects
in which the two types collaborate. Same holds for the pink ow that links Physics
Juniors and Non-Physics Seniors. The pink ow that turns back into the pink part
represents the projects in which Physics Juniors collaborate with other individuals of
the same type. One can easily see that Physics Juniors are working more frequently
with Seniors (both Physics and Non-Physics) than with Juniors from the same eld.
Moreover, a big portion of Physics Seniors collaborate with Non-Physics Seniors, as
suggested by the purple ow that links the two types. The evidence suggests that the
allocation of researchers to projects is non-random. I show that these paths hold also
when controlling for project characteristics. I exploit this variation for identifying the
main determinants of project participation in the structural model.
2.3. Model
In this section, I present a structural model to quantify the determinants of projects’
outcomes controlling for the endogenous drivers of working collaborations. For every
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project, each researcher type observes the set of exogenous characteristics and the set
of potential entrants, and her own idiosyncratic shock. She decides whether to join a
working project by comparing post-entry single period payos.18 In the last stage, a
project ends and the outcome realizes. The model is composed of two parts. First, I
present the structural model of project participation as an entry game of incomplete in-
formation. Then, I dene the outcome equation; this expresses the outcome of a project
as a function of dierent factors, including the number of researchers determined in
the rst stage.
2.3.1. Game of Project Participation
I model the decision to join a project as an entry game with incomplete information,
following the literature on estimating games of incomplete information (e.g. Seim
(2006)). The model is static and agents make their decisions simultaneously. The payo
form joining a project is positive, while the payo from not joining is normalized to
zero.19 For every project, a type decides whether to join a working project by comparing
single-period payos.
Payo Function
Consider a set of projects J “ t1, ..., Ju indexed by j, where each project belongs
to a macro-project. A researcher is dened uniquely by her type g, with g “ 1, ..., G.
An agent-type wants to join a project because of the other agent-types she might work
with or because the project has desirable features (for instance, high ex-ante quality).
The latent benet of joining a project can capture short-term reputational concerns,
willingness to learn or intrinsic motivation. The payo associated with the decision of
joining a project depends on the following factors. First, it depends on the exogenous
characteristics of the project, including the macro-project the project belongs to and
its ex-ante quality. Second, it depends on the strategic interactions among participants,
18I abstract from any dynamic consideration in this paper for several reasons. First of all, the projects
are relatively small and last a short amount of time. Therefore long-term reputation concerns that lie
under any dynamic decision are rather negligible. Second, a dynamic setting will have the disadvantage
of ignoring the intermediate steps in terms of project nal outcomes. Repeated interactions among
players may obviously aect the decision of joining certain projects.
19This assumption is standard in the literature of entry games.
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namely who else is potentially joining the project. Finally, the decision hinges also on
a stochastic component, that gives information about the ability of the type to work
on the project. The payo of researcher of type i associated to joining project j takes
the following form:
piij “ αiXi ` η1Dj `
Gÿ
g“1
δigNgj ` q˜j ` ij (2.1)
Xi is the vector of type characteristics (dummies for the four types: Physics Seniors,
Physics Juniors, Non-Physics Seniors, Non-Physics Juniors), Dj is comprehensive of
macro-project dummies and other project exogenous characteristics (number of pre-
determined teams, number of external rms) of project j; Ngj denotes the number of
researchers of type g in project j;20 q˜j is the ex-ante project quality and it is unobserved
by the econometrician; ij is the researcher type and project-specic shock. Each
researcher observes her own project-individual-specic shock, but only knows the
distribution of the others’ errors; therefore, the described entry game is a game of
incomplete information.
The vector of parameters to estimate is given by θ1 “ pα, η, δq. In particular, δs
capture the strategic substitutability/complementarity with respect to the teammates.
Because of imperfect information about her teammate payo, i can only form expec-
tation of their optimal choices. Based on the expected teammate distribution across
projects, each researcher type chooses whether to join a project by maximizing her
payos given her own type. In particular, type i joins project j if:
Erpiijs “ αiXi ` η1Dj `
Gÿ
g“1
δig ErNgjs ` q˜j ` ij ě 0. (2.2)
20For sake of simplicity and in line with some of the literature on entry games of incomplete infor-
mation, I assume that the number of others researchers enters the payo linearly.
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Equilibrium
Dene as pi˚j the equilibrium probability of entering project j for i. Then, the fol-
lowing has to hold:
p˚ij “ Φ
˜
αiX ` η1D `
Gÿ
g“1
δigp
˚
gj ` q˜j
¸
(2.3)
for all i and j. Φp‚q is assumed to be a continuous CDF. Researcher type i’s vector
of equilibrium conjectures over all projects is then dened by the set of J equation
probabilities. The system (3) denes the equilibrium conjectures as a xed point of the
mapping from i’s conjecture of her teammates strategies into her teammates conjectures
of the i’s strategy. The existence is given by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem.21
2.3.2. Project Outcome
Researchers produce scientic projects of varying outcomes. The nal outcome of a
project can be expressed as a function of dierent “inputs”, which include the number
of researchers who endogenously participate to the project (this is in spirit close to
Akcigit et al. (2018)) and other project exogenous characteristics. Moreover, a project
might be better because of some idiosyncratic heterogeneous ex-ante components. I
include these components in what I dene as the ex-ante project quality.
There exist J and G researchers’ types. Each project j ends with a certain outcome.
The variable outcomej takes on a value of 0 or 1, depending on the project classication
(see 2.1). It underlies a continuous variable outcome˚, which is a latent variable for
degree of project completion. Ngj denotes the number of researchers of type g in project
j.22 The regression to estimate is the following:
outcome˚j “ τ `
Gÿ
g“1
βgNgj ` λ1Cj ` qj. (2.4)
21The agents’ own conjectures enter the probability simplex and are continuous in others’ expected
behaviour.
22In an alternative specication, I allow the outcome to be a quadratic function of Ngj .
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Cj is a vector of control variables, which include macro-project dummies, and other
types of controls (monthly dummies, number of pre-determined teams, number of
external rms). The vector of parameters to estimate is given by θ2 “ pτ, β, λq. The
coecient βg measures how an additional researcher of type g aects the nal project
outcome, and it can be considered as a proxy for performance. In other words, if the
coecient for a particular type is positive, this means that adding a researcher of that
type increases the probability of the project completion. The term qj is the unexplained
component of the outcome and measures the ex-ante unobserved project quality.
2.4. Empirical Implementation
I estimate the model discussed in section 3 to quantify the main determinants of
endogenous project participation, and the project outcome equation to assess the per-
formance of teams and solo researchers. A complication to be tackled in the estimation
is the fact that the ex-ante project quality, which is unobserved by the econometrician,
aects the decision to join a project. Moreover, qj inuences the nal outcome in two
ways. First, it enters the outcome directly as a residual; second, it aects the project
outcome indirectly through the number of project participants. I could potentially com-
pute the residuals from the outcome equation and use them to estimate the parameters
of the structural model. Because of selection, the measure of the residual from the out-
come equation is likely to be biased. Hence, I estimate the two empirical components
jointly. I express the residuals in terms of the outcome parameters and I use them to
estimate the model of project participation.
First, I present the estimation procedure for the game of project participation. Then,
I discuss the estimation for the project outcome. Finally, I describe the procedure for
the joint estimation.
2.4.1. Game of Project Participation
I estimate a static game of project participation as an entry game with incomplete
information. I abstract from any dynamic consideration in my setting, as discussed
in 3. I assume that a player is privately informed about her own idiosyncratic shock
and knows only the distribution of other players’ shocks. The assumption is realistic
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if one thinks that a player has a dierent t for/to each project, and the t is not
perfectly known by the others. Moreover, the models of incomplete information have
an advantage in terms of computational burden.
Entry games with strategic interactions are likely to lead to multiple equilibria, es-
pecially in the presence of strategic complementarities. Solutions to this multiplicity
problem have been proposed by, among others, Bjorn and Vuong (1984), Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991b), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) and Berry (1992). Papers on moment in-
equalities (Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)) allow for general forms of heterogeneity across
players providing a methodology for set identication without making equilibrium se-
lection assumptions. However, bounds for the estimated coecients are likely to give
very little information on the type of strategic interactions among players if their ranges
are too broad. This is not well suited in this setting given that one of the mail goals
is to measure the degree of complementarity and substitutability among researcher
types. Alternatively, Schaumans and Verboven (2008), for example, impose assump-
tions on the sign of the strategic parameter, but in this framework any assumption
would appear to be ad hoc. Part of the recent literature deals with the multiplicity issue
by using a two-step estimation procedure (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002, 2007; Bajari,
Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov, 2010), without imposing any further assumptions on the
strategic parameter. The method eliminates the need to solve the xed-point problem
when evaluating the corresponding (pseudo) likelihood function that is implied by the
structural choice probabilities.23 I adapt the two-step method to my static framework
and, dierently from the standard literature on entry games, I allow for strategic com-
plementarity and substitutability. In the rst step, I estimate the probabilities of entry
conditional on project observables.24 In the second step, I nd the structural parame-
ters that are most consistent with the observed data and these estimated equilibrium
probabilities. A key assumption for the consistency of this approach is that, in the data,
two projects feature the same equilibrium conditional on observables.25
23(Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007) have proposed a recursive extension of the two-step pseudo-
likelihood estimator.
24Ideally, one should estimate these probabilities non-parametrically. However, the two-step proce-
dure is embedded in a joint maximum likelihood estimation, therefore I estimate the rst step paramet-
rically to increase the speed of the estimation.
25Several authors have introduced extensions to allow for multiplicity of equilibria when two markets
have the same observable characteristics. De Paula and Tang (2012), for instance, propose a test for the
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Pseudo Log-likelihood Function
Let dij be the choice of researcher type i of joining or not project j. Moreover, let
Ψi “ ΦpαiXi ` η1Cj `řGg“1 δigpgj ` q˜q, where Ψi follows a logistic distribution. The
Pseudo-Likelihood Function is the following:
QJpθ,pq “ 1
J
1
G
Jÿ
j“1
Gÿ
g“1
log Ψipdij|X,C, q˜;p, θ1q (2.5)
2.4.2. Outcome Equation
I estimate the outcome equation using a discrete choice model. For outcome˚ being
the latent continuous variable for degree of project completion, then
outcome “
$&%0 if outcome˚ ă τ1 otherwise
I assume that the error terms are iid logistically distributed across observations and I
set the location and scale parameter equal to 0 and 1, respectively.
The unobserved ex-ante quality is given by the residual of the logit regression. In
the case of latent models (probit, logit, ordered probit, etc.) it is not possible to calculate
the residuals directly, since the latent dependent variable outcome˚ is not observed.
I do have an estimate of the conditional distribution of outcome˚ conditioned on the
observable variables (vectorX), based on the specication and the maximum likelihood
parameter estimates. From this, I can obtain an estimate of the conditional distribution
of the error term qj , from which I construct the generalized residuals q˜j following
Gourieroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987):
q˜j “ Erqj|X, θˆ2s, (2.6)
signs of state-dependent interaction eects that does not require parametric specications of players’
payos, the distributions of their private signals, or the equilibrium selection mechanism.
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where θˆ2 “ pτˆ , βˆ, λˆq is obtained by maximum likelihood.26 The residual captures all
the unobserved factors that enter the ex-ante project quality. Researchers are likely to
sort into projects because of this component. Therefore, sorting creates a problem of
endogeneity that biases the results of the estimation.
2.4.3. Joint Estimation
I need to estimate the probability of completion of a project and the entry probability
jointly to overcome the endogeneity issue, with the caveat that some covariates aect
contemporaneously the two of them.
I follow Seim (2006), who estimates a model of entry with endogenous product-type
choices by computing the joint equilibrium prediction for the location probabilities and
the equilibrium number of entrants in a market. I compute the joint prediction for the
probability of project completion and the equilibrium number of project participants.
In Seim (2006), however, the location decision does not depend on the market-level
unobservable, which inuences only the probability of entry. Therefore, she is able
to obtain the market-level unobservable so that the predicted number of entrants co-
incides with the observed number in each market. Then, she uses the market-level
unobservable to compute the location-choice probabilities.
In this setting, the project-level unobservable qj aects both the decision to join
a project and the project outcome, directly and indirectly through Nj . Therefore, to
account for this issue, I express the generalised residual q˜j (equations (9) and (10)) as
26Gourieroux et al. (1987) show that the score vector can be expressed in terms of generalised errors.
Dene the loglikelihood:
lnL “
Jÿ
j“1
log Ψpoutcomej |N,C; θ2q. (2.7)
The rst order derivative (score function) with respect to the constant (Greene (2003)) produces the
generalized residual. For outcomej “ 0:
q˜j “ Erqj |outcomej “ 0, N,C, θˆ2s “ ´φpτˆ ´ βˆNj ´ λˆ
1Cq
1´ Φpτˆ ´ βˆNj ´ λˆ1Cq
(2.8)
For outcomej “ 1:
q˜j “ Erqj |outcomej “ 1, N,C, θˆ2s “ φpτˆ ´ βˆNj ´ λˆ
1Cq
Φpτˆ ´ βˆNj ´ λˆ1Cq
(2.9)
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a function of the outcome variables and I substitute it into the payo function. By
doing that, I estimate the equilibrium parameters of the model of project participation
taking into account the project ex-ante quality (unobserved by the econometrician) and
I correctly solve for the endogeneity in the outcome equation. For dened dgj (action
of type g for project j), the joint pseudo-likelihood is:
fpd, outcomeq “
Jź
j“1
Iź
i“1
Prpdij|X,C, q˜;P, θ1q ˆ
Jź
j“1
Prpoutcomej|N,C; θ2q. (2.10)
Equation (10) consists of two parts. The rst part computes the likelihood of observing
project participation choices conditional on the project-level unobservable q˜. Recall that
q˜ is the random factor that aects also the probability of observing a particular outcome
realization. Therefore, to derive the unconditional likelihood, the rst component of
the joint pseudo-likelihood is multiplied by the probability of observing an certain
outcome such that predicted and actual probability of project completion are equal.
Because of simultaneity, I derive the unconditional likelihood by expressing q˜ as a
function of the outcome parameters and regressors and substitute it into the payo
function for the model of project participation. I assume that the error terms of the
model of project participation and the outcome equation follow a logistic distribution.27
The joint pseudo-loglikelihood is the following:
LLpθq “ 1
J
1
G
Jÿ
j“1
Iÿ
i“1
log Ψipdj|X,C, q˜;p, θ1q ` 1
J
Jÿ
j“1
log Ψpoutcomej|N,C; θ2q
(2.11)
Two-Step Procedure
In line with the estimation procedure for the model of project participation described
in 4.1, I perform the joint estimation in two steps.
1. I maximize the joint loglikelihood without the vector p and obtain the reduced-
form estimates of the equilibrium probabilities of entry, together with the es-
timates of θStep11 , θ
Step1
2 . In this step, I account for the correlation between the
27I restrict the variance covariance matrix of the joint distribution of the error terms to be an identity
matrix.
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project outcome and the model project participation through q˜j , but not for the
endogenous entry as I do not consider the strategic interactions (δ1s “ 0).
2. With the probabilities predicted in the rst step, I construct the joint pseudo-
loglikelihood function (11)28 and obtain the nal estimates for θˆ1, θˆ2.
2.4.4. Identification
The outcome equation is at the project level, whereas the payo function is at
the individual-project level. Some variables are included only in the payo and do
not impact the outcome directly. Indeed, type-specic characteristics aect only the
decision of joining a project. The term Ngj contained in the outcome equation is the
post-equilibrium total number of researchers in a project. The termErNgjs in the payo
function represents the expectation of the number of potential entrants in a project for
each researcher before she takes the decision to join/not join. The two terms are highly
correlated. Simulation results show that the identication of the strategic coecients
(δ’s) requires variation in the predicted entry probabilities from stage 1 across types.
I observe the same set of researchers working both on solo and team projects, where
teams are heterogeneous and can have dierent sizes. The identication strategy of
the structural parameters exploit this heterogeneity in team memberships in the data.
2.5. Results
In this section, I discuss a number of reduced-form preliminary results. Then, I ad-
dress the estimation of the full model that comprises researchers’ participation choices
and project outcomes.
2.5.1. Preliminary Analysis
In this subsection, I show that free-riding is not a concern in this setting. Then, I
present reduced-form results in support of the full structural model.
Table 2.7 reports the results from preliminary OLS regressions of project outcome,
where the dependent variable can take values 0 or 1 (“not completed” or “completed”,
28For the second step, I initialize the loglikelihood at θStep11 , θ
Step1
2 .
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depending on the classication explained in section 2.1). This implementation is useful
to understand whether there is a non-linear relation between the outcome and the
number of project participants and to estimate the optimal threshold in the non-linear
case. Specication (1) includes as covariates the total number of researchers (linear
and square); specication (2) includes the previous covariates and the number of pre-
determined teams, while specication (3) has the same covariates of (1) and in addition
the number of external rms. Specication (4) includes all the covariates previously
specied and macro-project dummies. Each specication of table 2.7 shows that the to-
tal number of project participants aects project outcomes positively and signicantly.
The square term through all the specications has a negative and signicant coecient;
this suggests a concave relationship. Several rationales can underlie this hump-shaped
relationship. First, decreasing returns to scale in team production function. In par-
ticular, the marginal contribution of an additional researcher of a given type can be
decreasing as the improvement on the pre-existing stock of skills already present in the
project can shrink. Alternatively, free-riding in teams can imply that, as the number of
researchers increases, some researchers can exploit the work of the other teammates.
If free-riding plays an important role in this framework, one should expect to see that
many projects present a number of researchers exceeding the optimal one, that is de-
termined by the x-coordinate of the vertex of the parabola implied by the estimates of
the outcome equation. In all specications, the vertex of the parabola is signicant for
projects with more than 5 people. Only a small fraction of projects (around 5%, corre-
sponding to 112 projects) operate with more than 5 participants. Therefore, free-riding
does not seem to play a role in this setting.
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OLS
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
OLS
(4)
# of project participants 0.0559***(0.00955)
0.059***
(0.015)
0.0535***
(0.015)
0.055***
(0.015)
# of project participants2 -0.0049**(0.000962)
-0.0054***
(0.002)
-0.0046**
(0.002)
-0.0053**
(0.002)
# of pre-determined teams 0.077***(0.012)
0.057***
(0.016)
# of external rms 0.051***(0.02)
0.011
(0.02)
Macro-Project dummies No No No Yes
Threshold 5.7***(0.93)
5.51***
(0.82)
5.8***
(1.03)
5.2***
(0.74)
Number of obs: 2,243. All regressions include the constant term. Standard errors in
parenthesis.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 2.7.: Project Outcome Results: OLS
Table 2.8 displays the results from logit regressions for the model of project out-
come (equation (4)).29 The covariates include the total number of researchers (all the
specications) and the number of researchers squared (specication (3)), the number
of pre-determined teams (all the specications), the number of external rms (all the
specications except for (1)), a dummy for whether a project is a comment to another
project (specication (4)), time dummies (specication (5)) and macro-project dummies
(specication (6)). Holding other things xed, as the number of researchers in a project
increases, the project is more likely to be completed. The number of pre-determined
teams aects positively and signicantly the project outcome, while the number of
external rms and the dummy for comments are not signicant. The results are similar
across the dierent specications. I use specication (6) in the full structural model, as
this is the one with the best t according to the AIC selection test.
29I also perform other robustness checks using 3 categories for the outcome. Results from the ordered
categorical model are very similar. Same holds for the results of the probit regressions.
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Binary Outcome
(1)
Binary Outcome
(2)
Binary Outcome
(3)
Binary Outcome
(4)
Binary Outcome
(5)
Binary Outcome
(6)
# of project participants 0.93***(0.14)
0.92***
(0.03)
0.58***
(0.19)
0.5***
(0.1)
0.35***
(0.06)
0.55***
(0.05)
# of pre-determined teams 2.02***(0.5)
2***
(0.5)
1.5***
(0.5)
1.5***
(0.5)
1.5***
(0.5)
2.32***
(0.5)
# of external rms 0.9(0.73)
0.97
(0.72)
0.9
(0.75)
0.86
(0.75)
0.63
(0.77)
# of project participants2 -0.04(0.03)
Dummy for comments -0.1(0.3)
Macro-Project dummies No No No No No Yes
Time dummies No No No No Yes No
LL at convergence -693 -691 -690 -691 -663 -655
Number of obs: 2,243. All the specications include a constant. Standard errors in parenthesis. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 2.8.: Project Outcome Results: Logit
Researchers with dierent characteristics might aect dierently the probability of
project completion. Table 2.9 shows reduced-form results from logit specications of
the outcome equation where the number project participants is in terms of researchers’
types. The more the project participants for each type the higher the probability of
project completion. These results hold also when controlling for the number of pre-
determined teams (specication (2) and (3)) and macro-project dummies (specication
(3)). Notice that the eect on the probability of project completion is not randomly dis-
tributed across types. I use specication (3) in the full structural model for consistency
as this includes all the covariates of specication (6) in table 2.8.
In these regressions, I do not control for selection, therefore it is not possible to give
an economic interpretation to the results as researchers might select into projects with
a better ex-ante quality.
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Binary Outcome
(1)
Binary Outcome
(2)
Binary Outcome
(3)
# of Non-Physics Juniors -0.751(0.805)
-0.781
(0.809)
-0.363
(0.786)
# of Non-Physics Seniors 1.483***(0.099)
1.394***
(0.098)
0.744***
(0.116)
# of Physics Juniors 1.039***(0.154)
0.968***
(0.152)
0.665***
(0.147)
# of Physics Seniors 0.780***(0.050)
0.770***
(0.050)
0.402***
(0.070)
# of pre-determined teams 1.890***(0.509)
0.624
(0.565)
Macro-Project dummies No No Yes
Number of obs: 2,243. All regressions include the constant term. Standard errors in
parenthesis.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 2.9.: Project Outcome Results: Binary Outcome
Table 2.10 presents the results from the discrete choice model of project participa-
tion that does not include the strategic interactions and the unobserved project-level
component (ex-ante quality). In other words, I estimate equation (2.1) with δig “ 0 and
without controlling for qj . I assume that the set of potential entrants is random across
projects, and has cardinality equal to 10, as 10 is the maximum number of individuals I
observe in a project.30 The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a researcher joins a project
and 0 otherwise. As shown by equation (1), the latent payo of project participation is a
function of type and project characteristics. In specication (1), I only control for types’
characteristics by including dummies for Non-Physics Juniors and Seniors, and Physics
Juniors and Seniors. The reference group is given by non-classied researchers. In this
specication, Physics Juniors are more likely to join a project whereas the other types
are less likely to do so. Results remain unchanged when controlling for the number
of pre-determined teams (specication (2)). In this case, the higher the number of pre-
determined teams, the lower the probability of joining (pre-determined teams might be
a proxy for project complexity). When controlling for macro-project dummies (speci-
30I perform robustness checks also with sets of 8 and 9 random potential entrants. I will perform
robustness checks with dierent sets of potential entrants. One idea would be to determine the set of
potential entrants for each project by looking at the empirical distribution of types that joint projects
with similar characteristics before.
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cation (3)), results change. In particular, Non-Physics Juniors and Seniors are less likely
to join a project whereas people specialized in Physics are more likely to join a project.
This can be due to the fact that most of the projects are in the eld of physics. I use
specication (3) in the full structural model as controlling for macro-project dummies
seems to have an impact on the probability of joining a project.
Project participation
(1)
Project participation
(2)
Project participation
(3)
Non-Physics Junior -1.53***(0.025)
-1.51***
(0.027)
-0.35***
(0.056)
Non-Physics Senior -5.45***(0.23)
-5.55***
(0.23)
-4.31***
(0.241)
Physics Junior 0.367***(0.028)
0.38***
(0.028)
1.63***
(0.061)
Physics Senior -0.38***(0.028)
-0.37***
(0.05)
0.75***
(0.071)
# pre-determined teams -0.24***(0.06)
-0.88***
(0.074)
Macro-project dummies No No Yes
Number of projects: 2,243. Number of potential participants for each project: 10. All regressions include a
constant. Standard errors in parenthesis.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 2.10.: Model of Project Participation Without Strategic Interactions
The results presented in this section are likely to suer from endogeneity: re-
searchers can sort into specic projects based on the project ex-ante quality, that is
unobserved to the econometrician and correlated with some of the covariates (i.e. the
number of project participants as well as macro-project dummies). In the next section, I
show the results from the simultaneous estimation of the full structural model in which
I account for selection and endogenous participation. Other reduced-form results are
discussed in Appendix D.
2.5.2. Full Structural Model
In this subsection, I present the results from the joint estimation of the full structural
model. First, I show the results from a simpler specication in which I do not account
for heterogeneity in types. Then, I show the results when I estimate type-specic
coecients.
The results of Table 2.11 column (1) correspond to specication (6) of Table 2.8
from the previous section and show the reduced-form results for the probability of
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project completion. Column (2) corresponds to specication (3) of Table 2.10 from
the previous section and shows reduced-form results from the discrete choice model
of project participation without the strategic interactions and without controlling for
ex-ante project quality.
Recall the reasons to joint a project: it could be because the project is more likely
to end with completion (this is reected in the quality term) or because an individual
cares about who else is joining (this is reected in the strategic component). In column
(3) I allow only for correlation in project quality both in the outcome and in the project
participation model by estimating the joint maximum likelihood. Allowing for correla-
tion does not have a big impact on project participation but it changes the estimates
of the outcome equation. The magnitude of the parameter for the number of project
participants shows that in column (1) I was overestimating the eect on the probability
of project completion, hence I was overestimating the performance of teams.
In column (4), I control for the correlation in project ex-ante quality and endogenous
participation (i.e. who an individual gets to work with) by estimating the game of
project participation jointly with the outcome equation. First of all, notice that the
number of project participants in the outcome equation is a proxy for entry. Indeed,
once I control for endogenous entry in the joint estimation, the eect in the outcome
equation goes away. More interestingly, there is evidence of selection into team size.
When I control for endogenous selection on quality and team size, the coecient for
juniors non-physics turns out to be positive: non-physics juniors are more likely to
enter compared to what I nd in column (3). This can be explained for instance by
the fact that junior researchers want to joint projects to learn from others and to gain
experience. At the same time, seniors non-physics are still less likely to enter: they
don’t seem to obtain any gain from working with the others. The strategic coecient
for the number of expected entrants is negative: researchers dislike working with
groups that are too large. This can be explained by the higher costs of coordination
and communication that a researcher has to bear when working with larger groups.
The existence of coordination costs that increase with team size has been shown to
be an important obstacle for collaborative work (Becker and Murphy, 1992).31 Optimal
team size hinges on the trade-o between the benets of specialization and division of
31It has been proven that lowering coordination costs can increase the returns to collaborative work.
Agrawal and Goldfarb (2008) for instance show that a decrease in collaboration costs through the adoption
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labour and the increased coordination costs (Adams, Black, Clemmons, and Stephan,
2005); in this setting, the second component seems to play a bigger role.
To conclude, the main nding is that prospective collaboration with the others
mostly drives endogenous project participation. Ceteris paribus, the larger the number
of project-mates, the lower the probability of joining a working project, because of
congestion and increasing coordination and communication costs. Quality impacts
project participation but not as much as endogenous entry (captured by team size).
Finally, as selection into project is non random, controlling for quality and endogenous
project participation matters for obtaining unbiased estimates of team performance.
Selection might depend on the characteristics of the researchers’ types. For instance,
a Junior researcher might attach more value to joining a project with a higher ex-ante
quality than a Senior researcher because the rst cares more about her reputation
than the latter. The results presented in table 2.12 allow me to explore the eect of
heterogeneity on project participation and on the probability of project completion.
The results of column (1) correspond to specication (3) of Table 2.9; here the out-
come depends on the number of project participants of each types. The other covariates
are the same as the ones from column (1) of table 2.11. The more the project participants
for each type the higher the probability of project completion. However, by comparing
these results with those in column (1) of the previous table, one can see that the eect
of the number of project participants on the outcome is not randomly distributed across
types. Once again, it is not possible to give an economic interpretation to the results
as these do not control for selection.
Column (2) presents the results from estimating the model of project participation
without strategic interaction and without controlling for project ex-ante quality. The
results are the same as column (2) of table 2.11.
In column (3), I control for quality both in the outcome equation and in the model of
project participation. The coecients for the number of project participants by types
change with respect to column (1). This shows again that there is selection into quality
that has to be taken into account when estimating the performance of teams.
In column (4) I look at the combined eect of quality and endogenous project partici-
pation on the outcome and on the probability of joining. As expected, the coecients in
of Bitnet facilitates increased research collaboration between US universities and the specialization of
research tasks.
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the outcome are not signicant: the number of project participants by types is a proxy
for endogenous participation. When controlling for the further eect of endogenous
entry, Non-Physics Juniors are more likely to enter relative to column (3), whereas
Physics Juniors and Seniors are less likely to enter (again, relative to column (3)). Ad-
ditionally, the larger the expected pool of project-mates, the higher the probability of
participating for Seniors (both Non-Physics and Physics); vice versa for Juniors.
Table 2.11 showed that, on average, the larger the pool of participants, the lower the
probability of joining a working project. Now, I nd that this eect diers across types;
this suggests that heterogeneity in researchers’ characteristics plays an important role
in explaining selection into projects. Controlling for endogenous participation, the
probability of joining a project is lower for seniors relative to juniors. More importantly,
for seniors, the larger the pool of expected participants, the higher the probability of
joining. For juniors this result is ipped. The intuition is the following: if it is true
that juniors suer from implicit costs of coordination and congestion associated with
larger groups, senior researchers instead benet from working with larger groups in
expectations, as perhaps they have more expertise in organizing and handling them.
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2.6. Counterfactual
I use the results from the structural model to investigate the eect of alternative
allocation mechanisms on project participation and project outcome.
In the previous section, I provided evidence of endogenous selection into projects.
I have shown that this selection depends mainly on the expected pool of potential
project-mates. Moreover, I found that researcher types inuence the probability of
project completion in an heterogeneous way. A straightforward experiment is a coun-
terfactual scenario where project participants do not take into consideration who else
is joining a project when deciding whether or not to join. In other words, let’s as-
sume that a manager allows for voluntarily project participation based only on project
characteristics (including the project ex-ante quality), without revealing any further
information on how the others are selecting into projects.32
2.6.1. Project Participation
While the estimation of the structural game of project participation does not require
solving for an equilibrium, the implementation of counterfactual experiments typically
involves the computation of an equilibrium, or at least an approximation (Aguirre-
gabiria, 2012). The multiplicity of equilibria follows from the presence of strategic
complementarity. When I shut down the strategic component of the payo function, I
am able to abstract from this issue in simulating the optimal behavior of the agents.
For the counterfactual experiment, I use the predicted project ex-ante quality and
the estimated parameters from the structural model, and I set the strategic interactions
parameters (δ’s in equation (1)) to zero. I nd that, under this counterfactual, individuals
join more projects, and this result is stronger for juniors (physics and non-physics).
Recall that juniors are less likely to participate the higher the number of expected
project-mates. When juniors cannot form these expectations, they do not internalize
the eventual costs of coordination and communication deriving from working with
larger teams. As a consequence, they are more prone to join a project.
32Another implicit assumption is that communication among researchers is not allowed.
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Figure 2.5.: Chord Diagram for Bilateral Project Connections: Counterfactual
# of Projects
Non-Physics Seniors 1,537
Non-Physics Juniors 1,078
Physics Seniors 1,194
Physics Juniors 520
Table 2.13.: Number of Projects by Type: Counterfactual
Figure 2.5 shows the results in terms of bilateral project connections. Compared to
gure 2.4 in section 2, under this counterfactual experiment there is more diversity in
collaborations as the connections among types are more frequent. For instance, the
pink ows that connect Junior Physics to the other types have similar dimensions: this
means that Junior Physics cooperate almost equally with all the others.
When the decision of joining a project does not depend on who else is joining, there
is more participation and more variety in teams. The next step is to assess the eect of
this reallocation on project outcomes.
2.6.2. Project Outcome
To measure the eect of the alternative mechanism of project allocation on project
outcome I use the estimated coecients of Table 2.12 column (3); these results cor-
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respond to the rst step of the joint estimation, in which I correct for selection into
quality.33
I nd that the counterfactual percentage of completed projects is 6% lower than that
observed in the data. Therefore, shutting down the strategic interaction in the decision
to join a working project leads to excessive participation, which aects negatively the
probability of project completion; team variety does not alleviate this eect.
I show that under this hypothetical scenario more team diversity is achieved. Di-
versity is often claimed to be a crucial condition for radical innovation (Nelson and
Winter, 1982; Singh and Fleming, 2010). It has been shown that structurally diverse
teams are more likely to produce breakthroughs (Guimera et al., 2005; Jones, Wuchty,
and Uzzi, 2008). According to Banal-Estañol, Macho-Stadler, and Pérez-Castrillo (2019),
teams that exhibit greater diversity in knowledge and skills, education, and/or scien-
tic ability are generally more likely to be successful. In contrast, I nd that under
this counterfactual scenario higher eciency of project outcome is not achieved due
to the fact that there is excessive project participation. This seems to suggest that it is
more ecient to let researchers decide their teams also based on who else is potentially
joining, as they optimally internalize the costs and benets of working with others.
The results from this counterfactual experiment provide a concrete measure of the
important role played by the strategic motives in the allocation of researchers to projects
and for the probability of project completion.
2.7. Conclusion
This paper develops and estimates an empirical structural model that quanties the
main drivers of endogenous team formation and team performance when the allocation
of individuals to working projects is decentralized. The empirical analysis relies on
novel data from an important scientic experiment, which represents an ideal setting to
33Ideally, I should use the results from the joint structural model in which I control for quality and
endogenous participation, but the coecients of the outcome equation as expected turn out to be non-
signicant, and I cannot make any inference from the results. By using the estimates from column (3) I
do not control for the indirect eect of quality (namely, the selection based on the expected number of
project-mates whose decision in turn depends on the project ex-ante quality). However, I am still able to
quantify at least partially the eciency gain or loss when moving from a decentralized to an alternative
mechanism of project participation.
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study the decentralized allocation of individuals to projects. In particular, the decision
to join a project is mostly driven by two forces: on the one hand, a researcher can
sort into a project because of the prospect of collaborating with other project-mates;
on the other hand, a researcher can join a project because of its ex-ante better quality.
Controlling for individual and project characteristics, I disentangle the role played by
these two determinants on the researcher’s decision to join a project. I also show
how ignoring either force can lead to biased estimates in a decentralized framework of
allocation of workers to projects and, hence, to incorrect conclusions regarding team
performance. My main nding is that prospective collaboration is the most important
driver of whether to join a particular project. Ceteris paribus, the larger the number
of project-mates, the lower the probability of joining a working project on average,
as a consequence of the congestion or increasing coordination and communication
costs. However, heterogeneity in researchers’ characteristics plays an important role
in explaining selection into projects: for example, senior workers are more likely join
projects of expected larger size (as measured by the number of project-mates) relative
to junior workers. Finally, to assess the role of strategic collaboration, I consider a
counterfactual centralized mechanism in which this channel is shut down. When doing
so, I show how this leads to excessive entry and generates ineciency in terms of
project outcomes. My results suggest that adopting a decentralized mechanism of task
allocation within a rm can be more ecient because workers internalize the costs and
benets of working with other project-mates.
So far, the empirical literature has focused on working collaborations characterized
by exogenous team formation. However, this paper suggests that analyzing the eect
of endogenous team formation is crucial to study the problem of ecient allocation of
resources within a working organization. This aspect has become increasingly relevant
since many institutions are moving from a centralized allocations of workers to projects
to a (partly) decentralized one. This paper provides insights on the economic conse-
quences of decentralization for an ecient allocation of resources. Ignoring the factors
that drive endogenous team formation may result in incorrect conclusions regarding
the eciency of decentralized mechanisms of project participation. An interesting
follow-up would be to test dierent allocation algorithms in order to nd the one that
achieves the highest possible outcome in terms of eciency.
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The estimation procedure I have proposed in this paper could be adapted to study the
mechanisms behind endogenous alliances and partnerships. One example in industrial
organization is R&D joint ventures. One could potentially analyze the consequences
of policy restrictions targeted to joint ventures participants.
This paper leaves some aspects for future investigation. One concern is that there
can be constraints aecting the decision to participate to a project, such as time or
availability constraints. I control for them by including type-specic dummies in the
model of project participation. However, if these constraints are researcher’s specic
or time variant, then this can represent an issue because I do not explicitly model these
constraints in the decision of joining working projects. Likewise, I do not consider
potential spillovers among projects: when a researcher works on a project that is not
successful, she can possibly adjust her expectation regarding the outcome of a correlated
project. Moreover, I also assume that the researcher’s investment of time and expertise
is strictly project-specic, where in a real world setting some knowledge and skills can
be transferable across projects. These are important topics for future research. Despite
these assumptions, the paper moves a rst step forward the analysis of endogenous
team formation by proposing a tractable framework and using a novel source of data.
Exploring the above additional questions can shed a light on our comprehension of
team formation and allows us to understand why no man is an island.
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A. Examples of Projects
In project 1 (gure A.1), researchers align two mirrors on a lab desk so that a laser
can pass through the lens. In project 2 (gure A.2), researchers analyze data collected
from a measurement experiment.
Figure A.1.: Project 1
Figure A.2.: Project 2
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B. Other Descriptive Statistics
The following histogram shows the distribution of Logbook entries per project. Most
of the projects have only one entry.
Figure B.1.: Logbook Entries Distribution
The following plots shows the distributions of project participation for Non-Physics
Seniors (gure g. B.2) and Physics Seniors (gure g. B.3). The two distributions look
very similar.
45
0
10
20
30
40
50
%
 o
f P
ro
jec
ts
1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of Non−Physics Seniors
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C. Examples of Outcome
Classifications
Project with classication 0: “Looking at NARM_LOCK_state it seems that the
lock could hold until around 10 UTC this morning. From that time a series of relocks attempts
(with lock periods of dierent duration) has triggered until around 14:20 UTC were the lock
could not be achieved anymore [...].”
Project with classication 1: “As foreseen after the completion of Long Towers scaold-
ing [...] also the DET Tower has been equipped with a Frigerio Style scaolding. The installa-
tion could be completed, yesterday, in a single day [...].”
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D. Other Reduced-form Results
Table D.1 and D.2 contain additional reduced-form evidence that shows clear paths in the
connections among dierent types even controlling for projects’ characteristics.
In particular, table D.1 shows the predicted probabilities from a multinomial logit regression
where the dependent variable takes value 0 if there are no Non-Physics Senior in a project, 1 if
one Non-Physics Senior joins, 2 if two Non-Physics Seniors join and so on and so forth. All the
regressions include macro-tasks dummies and a constant. Column (1) includes as regressors
the number of project participants of all other types. In column (2), I predict the probabilities of
being in a project in absence of Physics Seniors. One can see that the probability of not having
Non-Physics Seniors decreases from 53% in column (1) to 42% in column (2): this means that
in absence of Seniors in Physics it is more likely that there will be one or more Non-Physics
Senior in the project. Hence, the nding suggests substitutability among seniors. Column (3)
shows that in absence of Physics Juniors it is more likely that a Non-Physics Senior is in a
project, as the predicted probability of not having Non-Physics Seniors changes to 49%, but
the eect is milder than before. The results of column (4) do not change from those in column
(1) as there are few Non-Physics Juniors in the sample.
In table D.2, I show the predicted probabilities of being in a project for Physics Seniors,
in the same spirit of the previous table. The average predicted probabilities in column (1) are
higher than those from the previous table: it is more likely that one or more Physics Seniors
are in a project relative to Non-Physics Seniors. Again, the results in column (2) suggest substi-
tutability among seniors: indeed, for a Physics Senior, the probability of being in a project in
absence of a Non-Physics Senior is 81%, which is higher than the average probability reported
in column (1) (74%). The predicted probabilities in column (3) do not dier from those of col-
umn (1), meaning that there is no reduced-form evidence for complementarity/substitutability
between researchers in Physics. Again, the results of column (4) do not change from those in
column (1) as there are few Non-Physics Juniors in the sample.
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Predicted probabilities Predicted probabilities Predicted probabilities Predicted probabilities
In absence of Physics Seniors In absence of Physics Juniors In absence of Non-Physics Juniors
Zero Non-Physics Senior 0.528***(0.0085)
0.423***
(0.017)
0.488***
(0.01)
0.53***
(0.0085)
One Non-Physics Senior 0.245***(0.008)
0.29***
(0.016)
0.25***
(0.01)
0.24***
(0.008)
Two Non-Physics Seniors 0.145***(0.007)
0.19***
(0.014)
0.16***
(0.0084)
0.144***
(0.007)
Three Non-Physics Seniors 0.057***(0.0047)
0.0566***
(0.007)
0.069***
(0.006)
0.057***
(0.004)
Four Non-Physics Seniors 0.014***(0.0025)
0.0167***
(0.0043)
0.017***
(0.003)
0.014***
(0.0025)
Five Non-Physics Seniors 0.0075***(0.0018)
0.0063***
(0.0022)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.0075***
(0.0018)
Six Non-Physics Seniors 0.0008(0.0006)
0.0003
(0.0004)
0.001
(0.0008)
0.0008
(0.0006)
Predicted margins calculated from multinomial regressions. All the regressions include macro-project dummies and a constant.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table D.1.: Predicted Probabilities of Project Participation for Non-Physics Seniors
Predicted probabilities Predicted probabilities Predicted probabilities Predicted probabilities
In absence of Non-Physics Seniors In absence of Physics Juniors In absence of Non-Physics Juniors
Zero Physics Senior 0.265***(0.007)
0.19***
(0.01)
0.265***
(0.008)
0.265***
(0.007)
One Physics Senior 0.35***(0.009)
0.39
(0.34)
0.35***
(0.01)
0.35***
(0.009)
Two Physics Seniors 0.23***(0.008)
0.25
(0.26)
0.23***
(0.009)
0.23***
(0.008)
Three Physics Seniors 0.09***(0.006)
0.10
(0.54)
0.09***
(0.006)
0.09***
(0.006)
Four Physics Seniors 0.037***(0.003)
0.03
(0.3)
0.033***
(0.004)
0.03***
(0.003)
Five Physics Seniors 0.013***(0.0023)
0.01***
(0.0025)
0.01***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.0023)
Six Physics Seniors 0.002**(0.0009)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.0009)
Seven Physics Seniors 0.0009(0.0006)
0.001
(1.46)
0.001
(0.001)
0.0009
(0.0006)
Predicted margins calculated from multinomial regressions. All the regressions include macro-project dummies and a constant.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table D.2.: Predicted Probabilities of Project Participation for Physics Seniors
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3. Common Ownership and Entry in
the Ontarian Cancer Drug Market
joint with Laura Grigolon
3.1. Introduction
One of the most debated issues in antitrust is the presence of large institutional
investors whose investment strategy involves owning large stakes in competing rivals,
especially in concentrated industries such as airlines, banking and pharmaceuticals.
Antitrust scholars worry that those large owners may have an incentive to intervene
in the competitive setting and induce the rivals to soften competition: according to
the common ownership hypothesis, an investor holding a controlling stake in several
competing rms might have nonzero prot weights among these rms. As a result,
rms’ entry, pricing, and investments decisions might be aected (Backus, Conlon, and
Sinkinson, 2020; Gilje, Gormley, and Levit, 2019).1
This paper documents in a rigorous manner the features of a highly innovative
industry characterized by a concentrated ownership structure, the cancer drug industry.
The analysis has the objective of studying the eect of common ownership on the
decision of a generic producer to enter the market. We focus on Ontario, the most
populated province of Canada. In 2019, around 220,000 new cases of malignant cancer
have been estimated in Canada. During the previous year, Ontario experienced circa
90,500 cases, with an age-standardized incidence rate of 571.1 cases per 100,000.2
1According to McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), Fichtner, Heemskerk, and Garcia-Bernardo
(2017), and Antón, Ederer, Giné, and Schmalz (2018), institutional investors may engage in active dis-
cussions with companies’ board and management or vote against other investors with the purpose of
inuencing the companies’ strategies.
2Ontario Cancer Statistics, 2018.
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Investor in 1993 Investor in 2020
TEVA Pharmaceutical
American Cent Invt Mgmt, Inc. 7,7% Capital Research & Mgmt Co. 15%
Fidelity Mgmt & Research Co. 6,6% Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 3,9%
Capital Research & Mgmt Co. 5,4% BlackRock Fund Advisors 2,7%
Peregrine Capital Mgmt 4,6% Abrams Capital Mgmt LP 2,2%
Columbia Wanger Asset Mgmt LLC 4,3% Migdal Insurance Co. Ltd. 2%
Amgen
Alliance Capital Mgmt 2,8% The Vanguard Group, Inc. 8%
Sarom Fayez 2,8% Capital Research & Mgmt Co. 6%
Axa Financial, Inc. 2,6% BlackRock Fund Advisors 5,3%
Tiger Mgmt Co. 2,3% SSgA Funds Mgmt, Inc. 4,4%
Bankers Trust NY Co. 2,2% PRIMECAP Mgmt Co. 3,1%
Pzer
Sarom Fayez 2,8% The Vanguard Group, Inc. 7,9%
Alliance Capital Mgmt 2,4% SSgA Funds Mgmt, Inc. 5,3%
Axa Financial, Inc. 1,9% BlackRock Fund Advisors 4,9%
State Str Co. 1,9% Capital Research & Mgmt Co. 4%
Wellington Mgmt Co. LLP 1,8% Wellington Mgmt Co. LLP 3,9%
Table 3.1.: Corporate Ownership Top Cancer Drugs
Common ownership linkages are a well-established feature of many industries, in-
cluding the cancer drug industry. Table 3.1 shows the top ve shareholders for the
biggest cancer drugs publicly listed companies in Canada for the years 1993 and 2020.
One can see that common ownership was present already in 1993, but the percentage of
shares held is more concentrated nowadays. BlackRock and Capital Research, among
the world’s largest institutional investors together with the Vanguard Group, possess
a signicant amount of stocks in all the three companies.3 Moreover, as of April 2020,
the Vanguard Group is the top shareholder of Amgen Inc, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Bris-
tol Myers Squibb, Pzer Inc., Johnson & Johnson and Merck & Co., that are the main
pharma companies operating in the Canadian drug cancer industry.4
The cancer drug industry is an attractive setting for several reasons. First, markets
are well dened in terms of the timing of entry. Second, cancer drugs are extremely
expensive and generic medicines are crucial to lowering their prices. Third, cancer
3Sources: Thomson Reuters for 1993 and money.cnn.com for 2020.
4Sources: Bloomberg website, money.cnn.com, simplywall.st, marketscreener.com.
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drugs budgeting is an important percentage of the public health expenditure and it is
constantly growing over time: in line with the national trend, hospital and public drug
program spending on cancer drugs in Ontario reached 550.7$ millions in 2018, account-
ing for 8.5% of the total public drug program spending, with a 25% increase relative to
the previous year.5 These factors, together with the high level of concentration, make
it an appealing setting to understand the consequences of common ownership.
Market entry decisions are usually intended as substitutes due to competition. How-
ever, the presence of common ownership can reverse this idea. In our paper, we aim
at understanding what are the main components of this phenomenon and how it links
with rms’ strategic decisions of entering a market. The analysis has important wel-
fare implications and it can be helpful for policy-makers to understand the target of an
eventual intervention.6
We use unique data on the timing of cancer drug entry in the market (branded
and generics) and collect information on patents, drug approvals, and drug indications
for the years 1993-2019. We complement our dataset by gathering ownership data
mainly from 13F lings. In our sample, around half of the drug markets with generics
experience common ownership between the brand and one or more generics during
the years prior to the entry of the generic.
Following the recent literature (Backus et al., 2020; Newham, Seldeslachts, and
Banal-Estanol, 2018), we calculate a theoretically based company-pair-specic measure
of common ownership to empirically analyze this phenomenon in our setting. In par-
ticular, we look at pairs of companies and pairs of brand-generics for each drug market.
Ownership concentration is a long-lasting feature of the cancer drug industry. In par-
ticular, we nd that overlapping ownership between brands and generics two years
before the generic entry is growing over time. Moreover, we show that the variation
in relative investors’ concentration explains a large part of the variation in common
ownership in our sample. We also quantify the importance of the co-movement be-
tween overlapping ownership and investors’ concentration when looking at variation
5Source: Canadian Institute for Health Information, page 27. https://www.cihi.ca/sites/
default/les/document/pdex-report-2019-en-web.pdf
6Another relevant aspect of this industry is that cancer drugs are often used in bundles. Song,
Nicholson, and Lucarelli (2017) for instance analyze the eects of a merger between two pharmaceutical
rms selling complements for colorectal cancer treatment. They nd that a merger may generate a
price decrease. Following the same argument, common ownership might further aect the level of
complementarity within products in the presence of bundling.
53
in common ownership for brands and generics prior to the generic entry. Our ndings
can be of interest for other innovative industries where common ownership represents
an important threat to competition.7
Basing on the empirical evidence of this paper, we plan to develop a structural
model of entry with strategic interaction, in the spirit of the entry models estimated in
the empirical IO literature (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991b). Using our data, we will test
whether the presence of an incumbent, the branded drug, sharing a common owner
with the entrant, has an impact on the entry probability of the generic and how the
probability changes when allowing for strategic interaction between generics. With
the structural model, we will be able to disentangle the economic eects of common
ownership on the consumers’ surplus, industry structure, and government expenditures.
In a counterfactual experiment, we will consider how these components change if any
engagement in corporate governance by institutional investors is limited or forbidden
(Backus et al., 2020).
This work relates to several strands of literature. Many papers that analyze the
determinants of generic entry decisions in drug markets nd that generic entry is
higher the larger the size of the branded drug’s market before the patent expiration
(Appelt, 2015; Morton, 1999, 2000; Saha, Grabowski, Birnbaum, Greenberg, and Bizan,
2006; Torres, Puig, Borrell-Arqué, et al., 2007). Regarding the Canadian pharmaceutical
industry, McRae and Tapon (1985) analyzes the post-market barriers to entry, while
Hollis (2002) nds that the rst generic entrant has a lasting competitive advantage.
None of these papers have looked at the interplay between common ownership and
entry in Canada.
The theoretical link going from common ownership to competition, initially studied
by Rubinstein and Yaari (1983) and Rotemberg (1984), has motivated new empirical
research to nd a signicant eect (Azar et al., 2018; Backus, Conlon, and Sinkinson,
2018; Koch, Panayides, and Thomas, 2018; Schmalz, 2018). Newham et al. (2018) study
how the presence of common ownership inuences the decision of entering US phar-
maceutical markets after the end of regulatory protection (o-patent drug markets).
7The pricing decision can be inuenced by common ownership (Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu, 2018)
and represents an additional threat to competition. In this particular market, prices are the result of a
complex bargaining process which involves the government and the rms, therefore we abstract from
prices assuming that they are set outside the setting.
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They show that an increase in common ownership decreases the likelihood of the entry
of generics.
We contribute to the literature in several aspects. First, we empirically assess the
presence of common ownership in the Ontarian cancer drug industry. Second, we
accurately document the dierences in the ownership components if one considers
linkages between companies or linkages between brands and generics. Third, we quan-
tify which of these components mainly drive the link between common ownership and
market entry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the
industry and the data. Section 3 describes the measure of common ownership used in
the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
3.2. Background and Data
In the pharmaceutical industry, brand companies engage in a process of research
and development to discover new drugs, and if the process is successful they apply for
drug approval. When the approval is granted, the brand is awarded data exclusivity for
a period that goes from three to seven years, depending on the drug. This exclusivity
protects the clinical data and runs concurrently with patent protection. Market exclu-
sivity refers instead to the period between the end of data exclusivity and the expiration
of the last patent.
Generic companies are able to enter a particular drug market once the regulatory
protections have expired. These companies need to be marketed as brand-name prod-
ucts and afterward they produce replications of brand drugs at a much lower cost.
During the market exclusivity period, generics can challenge the monopoly rights of
the brand in court.
Health Canada is the department of the Canadian Government that is responsible for
the country’s federal health policy, under the administration of the Minister of Health.
The department authorizes the sale and use of new drugs. Before the approval (or rejec-
tion) of a new medication, the process to review drug safety and ecacy information
from clinical trials takes on average between two and four years. After the approval,
each province must still decide whether or not to reimburse the cost of the new medica-
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tion. Sometimes, patients can obtain an experimental therapy through Health Canada’s
Special Access Programme (SAP) before the process ends.89
Most cancer drugs in Ontario are publicly funded by the Ministry of Health. The
New Drug Funding Program (NDFP), to which we have access, with information on
sales and drug prices, directly covers the cost of many newer and often expensive
injectable cancer drugs.10
We use data from several sources. General information on brands and generics,
including the date of entry in the market, are taken mainly from Health Canada and
drugbank.ca. Information regarding the ownership structure for the years of interest
(1993-2019) comes from the Thomson Reuters dataset. In the following sections, we
illustrate how we match the dierent datasets in more detail and provide a description
of the data.
3.2.1. Pharmaceutical Data
We collect information on entry dates of brands and generics from drugbank.ca. The
initial dataset contains 45 brands and 150 generics. We drop 1 brand and 22 generics as
we do not have information on the entry date. After removing other inconsistencies,
the nal dataset consists of 44 drug markets: 24 markets do not have generics, while
the remaining markets have in total 128 generics, with an average of 3 generics per
drug. Table 3.2 lists the 44 drugs, the number of generic entrants and the date of the
rst generic entrant. For the drug markets with generics, the number of generics goes
from 1 (Cabazitaxel and Rituximab) up to 17 (Zolendronic Acid).
We gather information on the end of data exclusivity from Health Canada and
patent expiration from Health Canada and CIPO (Canadian Intellectual Property Oce)
websites. Notice that a brand can patent or renew the patent of part of a drug; following
the literature, we refer to the last expiring date. Any product dened as a drug under
the Canadian Food and Drugs Act must have an associated Drug Identication Number
(or DIN). Once a drug has been approved, the Therapeutic Products Directorate issues
8https://laforcedmd.com/
9Once a drug is approved, there is the bargaining process on the price.
10Other programs are the Evidence Building Program and the Case-By-Case Review Program. For
the non-funded drugs, patients may use private insurance or pay directly. Source: Cancer Care Ontario.
https://www.cancercareontario.ca/en/cancer-treatments/ chemotherapy/funding-reimbursement/drug-
funding-faqs
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Drug Name N. Generics First Generic Entry
Aldesleukin 0
Arsenic trioxide 2 20.12.2019
Azacitidine 2 25.10.2017
Bendamustine 0
Bevacizumab 2 01.08.2019
Blinatumomab 0
Brentuximab 0
Bortezomib 8 17.11.2015
Cabazitaxel 1 18.12.2019
Cetuximab 0
Clodronate 1 13.05.2004
Denosumab 0
Docetaxel 8 01.03.2011
Epirubicin 0
Eribulin 0
Fludarabine 4 04.12.2006
Gemcitabine 11 20.11.2007
Interferon 0
Ipilimumab 0
Irinotecan 9 01.02.2006
Liposomal Doxorubicin 0
Nab-Paclitaxel 0
Nivolumab 0
Obinutuzumab 0
Oxaliplatin 11 16.12.2005
Paclitaxel 10 24.10.1997
Pamidronate 7 31.08.2001
Panitumumab 0
Pembrolizumab 0
Pemetrexed 8 03.06.2016
Pertuzumab 0
Plerixafor 0
Pormer sodium 0
Raltitrexed 0
Ramucirumab 0
Rituximab 1 11.12.2019
Romidepsin 0
Siltuximab 0
Temsirolimus 0
Topotecan 10 02.10.2009
Trastuzumab emtansine 0
Trastuzumab 3 06.06.2019
Vinorelbine 5 09.05.2007
Zoledronic Acid 17 25.07.2008
Table 3.2.: Drugs Information
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Figure 3.1.: Years Between Drug Launch and First Generic Entry in the Market
a DIN which permits the manufacturer to market the drug in Canada. The duration of
the exclusivity period diers in the type of drug and is between three and seven years.
In our sample, some drugs are newly issued, others have been granted new patents,
thus many drugs’ patents have not expired. Appendix A shows drugs DIN and patent
expiration dates for a subset of products.
Figure 3.1 shows the year range between the launch of the drug and the entry of the
rst generic in the market. Around 36% of generics enter between three 3 and 7 years
after the drug launch because of the standard period of market exclusivity. Nevertheless,
45% of generics enter between 9 and 12 years, in line with the fact that, dierently
from the standard pharmaceutical industries, the cancer drug is an innovative industry
and many drug patents are granted renewal. Figure 3.2 instead considers the entry for
all the generics. One can notice that generics continue to enter the market even after
many years from the brand entry, and the probability of entering after 20 years is 12%.
From drug formularies and monographs, we collect information on the main drugs
indications (or therapeutic elds), which are presented in table 3.3. Six drugs are mainly
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Figure 3.2.: Average Years Between Drug Launch and Any Generic Entry in the Market
used for breast cancer and ve for colorectal or rectal cancer, reecting that in Ontario
the most commonly diagnosed cancers are breast and colorectal.11
3.2.2. Common Ownership Data
The Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) dataset, available through the
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), contains the identier of each listed com-
pany and the total number of outstanding shares at the monthly level. For subsidiary
companies, we go back to the listed parent or the listed holding the company belongs to,
assuming that they are fully controlled by the parent (Newham et al., 2018). The CRSP
dataset takes into account that companies may change their identity in the course of
the sample period and that some of the companies may go public at some point in time
and then become private again.
We use the identier to match these data with ownership data from the Thomson
Reuter’s s34 database, also available in the WRDS (Gerakos and Xie, 2019; He and
Huang, 2017; Schmalz, Azar, and Sahil, 2016). The database reports 13F lings, that
11As reported in 2018 from the Ontario Cancer Statistics.
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Drug Name Main Indication
Aldesleukin Metastatic renal cell carcinoma
Arsenic trioxide Acute promyelocytic leukemia
Azacitidine Myelodysplastic syndrome and acute myeloid leukemia
Bendamustine First line indolent non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and mantle cell lymphoma
Bevacizumab First line metastatic colorectal cancer
Blinatumomab Relapsed or refractory B-cell precursor acute lymphoblastic leukemia
Brentuximab Hodgkin’s lymphoma
Bortezomib Relapsed or refractory myeloma
Cabazitaxel Metastatic castration resistant prostate cancer
Cetuximab Locally advanced squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck
Clodronate Metastatic breast cancer
Denosumab Hormone-refractory prostate cancer
Docetaxel Adjuvant breast cancer
Epirubicin Adjuvant breast cancer
Eribulin Metastatic or incurable locally advanced breast cancer
Fludarabine Stage III-IV follicular lymphoma
Gemcitabine Advanced pancreatic cancer
Interferon Melanoma
Ipilimumab Previously treated advanced unresectable melanoma
Irinotecan First line metastatic colorectal cancer
Liposomal Doxorubicin HIV positive Kaposi’s sarcoma
Nab-Paclitaxel Metastatic breast cancer
Nivolumab Unresectable or Metastatic Melanoma
Obinutuzumab Previously untreated chronic lymphocytic leukemia
Oxaliplatin Adjuvant treatment of Stage III or high-risk Stage II colon and rectal cancer
Paclitaxel Adjuvant breast cancer
Pamidronate Plasma cell myeloma
Panitumumab Metastatic colorectal cancer
Pembrolizumab Unresectable or metastatic melanoma
Pemetrexed First line or induction for the treatment of cell lung cancer
Pertuzumab Positive unresectable locally recurrent or metastatic breast cancer
Plerixafor Stem cell mobilization in non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma or multiple myeloma
Pormer sodium Photodynamic therapy for NSCLC
Raltitrexed Metastatic colorectal cancer (single agent)
Ramucirumab Advanced gastric cancer or gastro-esophageal junction adenocarcinoma
Rituximab Diuse large B-cell lymphoma/aggressive
Romidepsin Relapsed or refractory peripheral T-cell lymphoma
Siltuximab Multicentric Castleman’s disease (MCD)
Temsirolimus Metastatic renal cell carcinoma
Topotecan Advanced ovarian cancer
Trastuzumab emtansine Unresectable locally advanced or metastatic breast cancer
Trastuzumab Gastric cancer
Vinorelbine Metastatic breast cancer
Zoledronic Acid Hormone-refractory prostate cancer
Table 3.3.: Drugs Indications
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are required by the SEC for all investment managers of US companies with over $100
million in holdings.12 In particular, we have quarterly data for the years 1993-2019 and
compute the yearly shares averaging out across quarters. We focus on shareholders
that own at least 1% of shares in the company.
There are 41 unique companies (including both brands and generics) in the dataset.
Some companies are listed outside the US stock market, and the ownership information
is not contained in the Thomson Reuters dataset.13 For these companies, we gather
information from other sources, such as company websites and nancial websites, with
the caveat that we are only able to nd information on the current ownership. The
remaining 14 are private companies not publicly listed on a stock exchange. We assume
that they do not have common investors with any other. A public company may have
no ownership information within a certain year in the Thomson Reuters dataset: in
this case, we remove it from the analysis for that sample period (Newham et al., 2018).
The dataset consists of 968 company/year/country observations.14 For the North
American countries, the dataset contains 510 observations.15 Table 3.4 shows the time
series of the top 5 shareholders in the industry for the full sample. The industry seems
very concentrated, as only 18 unique investors have been regular occurrences as top
industry shareholders in over 25 years.
Because the industry we consider is highly innovative and many drug patents are
not expired, we calculate the measure of common ownership in the year of generic
entry, one year prior and two years prior, as it takes some time for the generic to
prepare the entry in the market. 16 During the market exclusivity period, generics can
challenge the monopoly rights of the brand in court, for instance through Paragraph
IV certication, while brands might engage in strategic decisions (when choosing the
advertising level for instance) to deter market entry (Ellison and Ellison, 2011). Our
12It has been recently noted that this dataset might have some gaps in coverage (Backus et al., 2018).
By comparing the information contained in the dataset with other external sources such as Bloomberg,
Thomson Reuters is a good source for the companies in our sample.
13In particular, one is only listed in India, two in Japan, one in Switzerland, and one in South Korea.
14It contains the following countries: Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
UK and US
15We also drop duplicates and inconsistent observations.
16Newham et al. (2018) look at common ownership for the year of the end of exclusivity, one year
prior and two years prior.
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approach has the advantage to capture possible links between companies also in case
generics apply for Paragraph IV.17
In table 3.5 we show for each product the number of shareholders in common be-
tween generics and brand; it is calculated for the year of generic entry (t), the year
prior (t ´ 1) and two years prior (t ´ 2). Common ownership is a prevalent feature
for 8 drug markets. As Topotecan and Zoleandic Acid have the highest number of
generics (table 3.2), their generics also experience the highest concentration of share-
holders in common with the respective brands. Moreover, one can see that common
ownership is larger in the years prior to the generics’ entry. This points to the fact that
dierent shareholders might exert control on the decision of a generic by owning large
stakes of the company.18 In the next paragraphs, we explore the link between common
ownership and entry emerging from these descriptive statistics.
17We plan to collect evidence on Paragraph IV lings for our drug sample.
18Newham et al. (2018) for instance nd a larger signicant eect of common ownership on the
generic entry probability one and two years prior the end of market exclusivity (Table C2 of the paper).
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3.3. Common Ownership Measure
Let b be the brand in the drug market, g “ t1, ..., Gu the (potential and actual)
generic and i “ t1, ..., Iu the investors. Denote the shares held by investor i in brand b
as βbi and the shares held in generic g as βgi. Investor i is a common owner if βbi ą 0
and βgi ą 0. The literature has proposed two measures of common ownership. The rst
one is based on the implicit assumption that investors actively engage with decision-
making (production function approach). The second one is theoretically founded and
poses that the generic’s decision-makers take shareholders’ portfolio interests explicitly
into consideration.
Denote as si the prot of investor i, which is given by the sum of prots over the
portfolio of investments weighted by cash-ow rights (Backus et al., 2020), so that:
si “ βbipib `
Gÿ
g“1
βgipig. (3.1)
In the presence of common ownership, companies maximize the prots of the share-
holders (O’Brien and Salop, 2000; Rotemberg, 1984). In each market, the objective
function Vg of generic g is proportional to the following term19:
pig ` κgbpib `
ÿ
f‰g
κgfpif , (3.2)
where pig is generic g’s own prot, pib is brand b’s own prot and pif is generic f ’s own
prot, f being any generic company dierent from g. In particular,
κgb “
ř
i βgiβbiř
i β
2
gi
(3.3)
is the prot weight. One can interpret it as the value of a dollar of prots accruing
to brand b, relative to a dollar of prots for generic g, in g’s maximization problem
(Backus et al., 2020). An analogous interpretation applies to κgf .20 We are interested in
the eect of common ownership between brands and generics, therefore in the analysis,
19We assume that the rule one share, one vote applies (also dened as proportional control).
20In pages 10 and 11 of their paper, Backus et al. (2020) provide an example of ownership to show
how the matrix of prot weights should look like.
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Common Owners
Drug Name Generic Company In t In t-1 In t-2
Bortezomib Sandoz Canada Ulc 5 5 6
Bortezomib Mda Inc 4 5 4
Bortezomib TEVA Canada Ltd, Actavis Pharma 66 60
Cabazitaxel Sandoz Canada Ulc 2 2
Fludarabine TEVA Canada Ltd 1 4
Fludarabine Hospira Healthcare Ulc 1 2
Gemcitabine TEVA Canada Ltd 11 1
Paclitaxel Mylan Pharma 11 11 10
Paclitaxel Sandoz Canada Ulc 12 13 15
Paclitaxel TEVA Canada Ltd 5 6
Pamidronate Fresenius Kabi Canada Ltd 9 13 8
Pamidronate Sandoz Canada Ulc 11 10 7
Topotecan Sandoz Canada Ulc 8 10 11
Topotecan Mylan Pharma 14 16
Topotecan TEVA Canada Ltd 14 16
Topotecan Sandoz Canada Ulc 8 8
Topotecan Actavis Pharma 5 4
Zoledronic Acid Taro Pharmaceuticals Inc 2
Zoledronic Acid TEVA Canada Ltd 8 10
Zoledronic Acid Mda Inc 8 9 9
Zoledronic Acid Mylan Pharma 7 1 11
Notes: These numbers include shareholders outside the North American
stock markets. For Bortezomib, we cannot distinguish the shareholders of
TEVA and Actavis as they belong to the same listed company (TEVA).
Table 3.5.: Number of Shareholders in Common
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we focus on κgb. Notice that when κgb “ 0, the generic company is maximizing only
its own prot, while mergers result in κgb “ 1. Any level of κgb ą 0 can arise in a
common ownership setting.
Let IHHIg be the Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the investors in company
g (or analogously in company b). Dene cospβg, βbq as the cosine similarity between
vectors βg and βb. It represents the cosine of the angle between the positions that
investors hold in b and those that investors hold in g. Backus et al. (2020) decompose
the prot weights into two terms:
κgbpβq “ cospβg, βbq ¨
d
IHHIb
IHHIg
. (3.4)
The rst part is dened as overlapping ownership and is the standard measure of common
ownership analyzed by the literature: the closer the investor positions, the smaller the
angle between the portfolios with the cosine similarity approaching one. The second
is dened as relative investor concentration and is interpreted as the ability of common
owners to exert control. Intuitively, ceteris paribus, generics with concentrated investors
will place more weight on their own prots and less weight on brand prots, and vice
versa.
3.3.1. Variance Decomposition
By decomposing κ, we are also able to understand what is the main source of em-
pirical variation in common ownership prot weights. Again, following Backus et al.
(2020), we take the log of κ and decompose the variance:
V arplog κgbq “V arplog cospβg, βbqq ` V ar
˜
log
d
IHHIb
IHHIg
¸
` (3.5)
` 2Cov
˜
log cospβg, βbq, log
d
IHHIb
IHHIg
¸
. (3.6)
The rst term is the contribution of the overlapping ownership to the total variance
of κ; the second term accounts for the variance in relative investor concentration; the
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third term represents the co-movement between overlapping ownership and relative
investor concentration.
3.4. Empirical evidence
In this paragraph, we report the results from the analysis on industry concentration
and its potential link with market entry. First, we present empirical evidence for all pairs
of companies in the sample. Then, we look at brand-generic pairs for each drug market.
Last, we compute the variance decomposition of our common ownership measures. In
all the specications, we concentrate on the North American stock markets.
3.4.1. Common Ownership Paths
In Figure 3.3 we report the median together with the 75th and 95th quantiles of
investor concentration.21 Notice that investor concentration increases over time. For
the most concentrated companies (95th quantile), the index raises above 1000 in two
dierent years. This value is not too far from 1500, which is considered the threshold for
moderately concentrated markets according to the DOJ and FTC standards. However,
one cannot conclude that the growing investor concentration automatically generates
a rise over time in κ, as the common ownership index is proportional to the ratios of
IHHI for the pairs of companies considered and the cosine distance between vectors
of shares.
In Figure 3.4 we illustrate the relationship between κ and cospβg, βbq over time across
pairs of companies. The trends are very similar, meaning that the cosine similarity
tracks very well the average prot weight. Moreover, dierently from Backus et al.
(2020), for these measures we do not observe an upward sloping trend and the values
move around relative large numbers (with a range similar to Backus et al. (2020) –
between 0.2 and 0.7). This shows that common ownership has always been a feature
of this industry compared to the set of S&P 500 rms analyzed by the authors.22
In our sample, the rst generic enters the market in 1997, but most generics entered
after 2001, as documented in Table (3.2). It is interesting to notice that after 2002
21The other percentiles do not show signicant time variation.
22In both gures, we exclude 96 company pairs with an IHHI above 0.5. They count for less than
the 0.005% of the sample. The IHHI is multiplied by 10,000.
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both κ and the cosine similarity index start increasing over time. One might conclude
that common ownership has been prevalent since the generics’ entry in the market.
However, this is not straightforward, as we need to look at common ownership between
pairs of brands and generics. For this purpose, we construct prot weights κbg. In
particular, in Figure 3.5 we show the trend over time of these weights for the year of
the generics’ entry, the year prior and two years prior. For an accurate comparison
between these measures, we use balanced data from 2005 to 2016 because more than
90% of generic companies publicly listed are concentrated in this time-frame.23 One
can immediately see that common ownership is increasing over time when we look
at the average prot weights two years before entry of the generic (Figure (c)). The
upward-slope trend is not obvious instead for the prot weights computed the year of
entry and one year prior. As it requires some years for a generic to prepare the entry in
the market, this seems to suggest that shareholders buy shares of market rivals some
time before the entry in order to intervene in their strategic decisions.
3.4.2. Results Variance Decomposition
In table 3.6, we show results from the variance decomposition for all company pairs
and brand-generic pairs.24 More than half of the variation in common ownership prot
weights comes from investor concentration. This holds across all the specications and
points to the fact that corporate governance plays an important role in these weights,
as a consequence of the high concentration of the industry. In line with the ndings
of Backus et al. (2020), for all the company pairs investor concentration has the largest
impact in shaping the prot weights variation in the cross section while overlapping
ownership explains the strongest percentage of common ownership change in the time
series. This happens because, although the IHHI grows over time, the index is such
that for some κ the numerator becomes larger while for others it shrinks.
It is interesting to analyze the covariance term for brand-generic pairs. While for
all company pairs the covariance has to be mathematically very close to zero since
we observe for each log relative investor concentration also its inverse, this does not
hold when looking at the prot weights κbg, which are unidirectional. Notice that
23Notice that these companies represent around 70% of the total population of generics.
24The results include only the actual generics, we plan to analyze these empirical regularities also
for sets of potential entrants.
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Cosine Relative IHHI Covariance
All Pairs
Raw 35,86% 64,13% 0,01%
Cross-section 35,52% 64,4% 0,08%
Time-Series 42,1% 57,9% 0%
Brand-Generic Pairs
Raw 29% 51,97% 19,03%
Cross-section 29,2% 51,4% 19,4%
Time-Series 34,87% 47,09% 18%
Note: The cross-section variation is residualized on year xed eects, the time-series is
residualized on company-pair xed eects. For brand-generic pairs, the decomposition is
calculated for κ two years prior the generic entry.
Table 3.6.: Decomposition Variance Log κ
in this case the percentage of variation in log κ explained by the covariance term is
large, exceeding 19% for the raw and cross-section variance. This means that the co-
movement between overlapping ownership and relative investor concentration plays
an important role in the change in common ownership between brands and generics. A
possible interpretation is that the same shareholders participate in common companies
and increase the percentage of shares in these companies.
3.5. Conclusions
Common ownership has become a central issue in recent debates on antitrust poli-
cies because the degree of common ownership grew in recent years, and some empirical
studies show that it has a large eect on the strategic behavior of companies held by in-
stitutional shareholders. As pointed out by Boller and Morton (2019), common owners
might have incentives to reduce competition so that industry outcomes such as prices,
quantities, capacity, or new product introductions are closer to the monopoly level. In
this paper, we analyze the features of the Ontarian cancer drug industry, a highly in-
novative industry characterized by a concentrated ownership structure. Using data on
brands and generics characteristics and ownership information collected from dierent
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sources, we empirically assess the presence of common ownership and quantify which
components mainly drive the link between common ownership and market entry. In
particular, we show that investors’ concentration plays an important role in dening
common ownership in the years prior to the entry of a generic in the market.
Common ownership may have anticompetitive eects and be harmful for welfare
(Azar et al., 2018). However, the literature on welfare and the policy implications of
common ownership is still underdeveloped (Sato and Matsumura, 2019). With the re-
sults of this paper, we make the rst important step in identifying the target of eventual
policy interventions to reduce common ownership, in this industry as well as in other
innovative industries characterized by a high level of concentration. A full structural
model that incorporates the analyzed features is ideal in order to quantify the drivers
of market entry in the presence of common ownership. It will allow to disentangle the
economic eects of this phenomenon on the consumers’ surplus, industry structure,
and government expenditures.
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E. Patent Expiration Dates
Drugs DIN and patent expiration dates for a subset of products, as of June 2020.
Sources: CIPO and Health Canada.
Drug Name Brand DIN Patent Expiration
Aldesleukin Proleukin 02130181 29.1.30
Arsenic trioxide Trisenox 02407833 1.10.18
Bevacizumab Avastin 02270994 22.2.33
Blinatumomab Blincyto 02450283 26.11.24
Brentuximab Adcetris 02401347 31.7.23
Denosumab Xgeva 02368153 25.6.22
Ipilimumab Yervoy 02379384 2.5.26
Nab-Paclitaxel Abraxane 02281066 21.2.26
Nivolumab Opdivo 02446626 2.5.26
Obinutuzumab Gazyva 02434806 12.8.30
Pembrolizumab Keytruda 02456869 13.6.28
Pertuzumab Perjeta 02405016 28.1.29
Plerixafor Mozobil 02377225 30.7.22
Ramucirumab Cyramza 02443805 4.3.23
Siltuximab Sylvant 02435128 26.10.22
Temsirolimus Torisel 02304104 25.7.23
Trastuzumab emtansine Kadcyla 02412365 23.6.20
Zoledronic Acid Aclasta 02269198 18.6.21
Table E.1.: DIN and Patent Expiration Date for a Subset of Drugs
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4. Bundling and Past Dependence of
Sin Goods among Adolescents
joint with Liana Jacobi and Michelle Sovinsky
4.1. Introduction
The Drug Policy Alliance (DPA), one of the biggest US non-prot organizations in
support of marijuana legalization, believes “marijuana should be removed from the
criminal justice system and regulated like alcohol and tobacco”,1 thus eliminating once
and for all the stigma of illegality for the consumption of the so-called sin goods.
Around two-thirds of Americans are in favor of marijuana legalization.2 Several are
the arguments in support of it. Some cannabis advocates stress the potential health
benets, as legalization would create standard requirements for all the marijuana prod-
ucts and promote consumer safety. Others point to the fact that making the drug more
easily accessible would drastically reduce the contact with illegal drug dealers and thus
decrease the probability of consumption of harder drugs. Another strong arguments
is that legal weed would eliminate the black market. As of April 2020, it is legal to
sell and buy marijuana for recreational use in Canada, Georgia, South Africa, Uruguay,
the Australian Capital Territory in Australia, and eleven states, two territories, and the
District of Columbia in the United States.3
1https://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/marijuana-legalization-and-regulation
2Pew Research Center, (2019). Published November 14, 2019 at https://www. pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-legalization. Accessed 10 March 2020.
3Another argument discussed in the policy debate is that homogeneous legalization across states
would remove the instability related to the conicting federal and states law, and this is at the basis of
the MORE Act (Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement), which proposes a unication
of the law at the federal level. The Judiciary Committee passed the Act in November 2019.
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When analyzing the consequences of marijuana legalization, one cannot ignore
two important factors. First, marijuana might be consumed with other products, such
as alcohol and cigarettes. Between 2007 and 2017, alcohol and cigarettes use declined
among US eighteen-years-old adolescents by ten percentage points while marijuana use
increased by four percentage points.4 Second, past use of one of the substances might
have consequences for the consumption of that substance and other sin goods, especially
if one considers complementarity in consumption. Addiction is a severe problem among
adolescents. In 2017, for instance, around ten percent of young Americans aged 18 to
25 was diagnosed with an alcohol use disorder, dened as alcohol abuse or dependence,
while nearly six percent had some sort of marijuana dependence.5
These pieces of evidence pose several important policy questions. Does the con-
sumption of marijuana aect the consumption of the other sin goods? What happens
when one considers the potentially addictive nature of the substances?
In this paper, we analyze the potential complementaritarities in use when individuals
choose to consume bundles containing marijuana, alcohol, or cigarettes, taking into
account persistence in behavior. In particular, we develop and estimate an economic
model of multi-use of substances that incorporates complementarities in use and allows
for habit formation. We then test our model empirically, by combining dierent data
sources: pre-legalization time series data on multi-substance use from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey for adolescents living in the United States, together
with pricing data for marijuana, alcohol, and cigarettes, collected from dierent sources.
Our parameter estimates show that it is important to account for correlation across
unobservables and persistence in behavior when analyzing the decision of using the
sin goods in combination. Moreover, we nd that the past use of a substance inuences
not only its current use but also the decision of using the substance together with
other substances. These results provide insightful information on the long-run eect
of legalizing marijuana for the consumption of potentially complementary addictive
products, such as alcohol and cigarettes.
The paper refers to several strands of literature. In a related project, Allocca, Jacobi,
and Sovinsky (2020) study the impact on youth of multi-substance use accounting for
4https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-development/substance-use/marijuana/index.html
5National Survey on Drug Use and Health. https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/les/ cbhsq-
reports/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018.pdf
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persistence within a dynamic structural model. Zhao and Harris (2004) estimate a joint
participation model for cannabis, alcohol, and tobacco use in a static reduced-form
framework, while the majority of the epidemiological literature that looks at the health
implications of substance use relies on cross-sectional data and estimates reduced-form
single equations models. Other studies have exploited policy changes such as change in
minimum drinking age (Crost and Guerrero, 2012; DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001), intro-
duction of marijuana for medical purposes (Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings, 2014)
or tax reforms (Pacula, 1998) to identify substitution or complementary relationships
between substance uses.
Papers in the literature have looked at the relationship between substances and
have found mixed evidence regarding the complementarities. For example, Crost and
Guerrero (2012), Cameron and Williams (2001), and DiNardo and Lemieux (2001) nd
evidence that marijuana and alcohol are substitutes, while Zhao and Harris (2004),
Wen et al. (2014), and (Pacula, 1998) nd evidence that they are complements. Regard-
ing marijuana and tobacco, there are fewer studies, with Zhao and Harris (2004) and
Cameron and Williams (2001) nding a complementary relationship.6
This paper also refers to the literature that estimates complementarities within a
structural framework, starting from Gentzkow (2007), who studies complementarity
among newspapers. More recently, Thomassen, Smith, Seiler, and Schiraldi (2017) de-
velop a multi-category multi-seller demand model to study the transportation costs in
grocery shopping; Ershov, Laliberté, and Orr (2018) analyze the complementarity be-
tween soft carbonated drinks and potato chips, while Fosgerau, Monardo, and De Palma
(2019) look at the complementarity between brands of RTE cereals. Moreover, Iaria and
Wang (2020) provide instrument-free identication and estimation methods that solve
the challenge of dimensionality related to bundling.
Several empirical studies have analyzed the eect of an early experimentation with
legal substances such as alcohol or tobacco on the later consumption of more addictive
illicit drugs (Kandel and Faust, 1975). Kenkel, Mathios, and Pacula (2001) underline
the importance for policymakers of understanding whether reducing the demand for
one drug has eects on the current and future use of other drugs. Pacula (1998) uses a
multi-commodity habit formation model to show for instance that prior use of alcohol
6For a recent epidemiological survey of the literature about the outcomes associated with the use of
cannabis and smoking as well as cannabis and alcohol, see Schlienz and Lee (2018).
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and cigarettes increases the likelihood of current use of marijuana, while Pierani and
Tiezzi (2009) do not nd evidence that past consumption of alcohol reinforces current
consumption of tobacco (and vice versa).
We contribute to the previous research in several ways. First, we present an eco-
nomic model to analyze the potential complementarities in use of substances. Second,
within this multi-use framework, we allow for persistence in behavior due to the poten-
tially addictive natures of the products. Third, we combine dierent data-sources that
are relevant for the empirical analysis. From a policy perspective, this paper represents
the rst step to study the impact of the legalization of an illegal substance such as
marijuana on the contemporaneous and future consumption of the sin goods.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background and the
datasets used. We present the model and the estimation methodology in Sections 3
and 4, and the identication strategy in Section 5. The results are reported in Section
6. Section 7 concludes.
4.2. Background and Data
The consumption of sin goods among adolescents is of primary importance for the
policy debate. Several surveys have shown that in 2013 alcohol and tobacco were the
drugs most commonly used by adolescents, followed by marijuana.7
For the empirical analysis, we use data from two primary sources. The rst are
individual-level panel data from the Transition into Adulthood Supplement (TAS) of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey. This is a longitudinal household survey
of US families conducted at the University of Michigan. The TAS began in 2005 and it
is run biennially to collect information on young adulthood transitions in schooling,
work, and family formation, including consumption behavior. The sample consists of
respondents between 18 and 27 years old from all the states in ve dierent waves: 2005,
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013. The panel data is required for the identication of the degree
of complementarity/substitutability among substances, as discussed momentarily. The
second source are pricing data for marijuana, alcohol and cigarettes for the same time
frame. These data are collected from state-level administrative tax data and month-
7Monitoring the Future survey, National Survey on Drug Use and Health.
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city-level transaction data. In the following subsections, we discuss the data sources
in more detail and provide a description of marijuana regulation across the dierent
states.
4.2.1. PSID Survey
The TAS of the PSID survey includes around 7,000 observations between 2005 and
2013. After dropping missing information, the sample consists of 6,440 observations
over the years for about 2,900 dierent individuals. The data include individual char-
acteristics of the respondents, as well as information on consumption decisions for the
three products.
Table 4.1 gives summary statistics of demographic characteristics. Individuals age
over time, as the average age goes from 21 years old to 23. The sample is almost evenly
distributed between gender and consists of about 47 percent non-hispanic whites. Most
of the individuals live in a metropolitan area (78%) and they report on average being in
very good health. A large proportion of respondents have a high school degree and the
percentage of adolescents going to University increases over time. Very few respon-
dents are married in 2005, though this percentage increases substantially between 2005
and 2013, as expected. Moreover, we control for years of parental education. About
58% of the households involve parents with only a high-school degree, while 15% have
a least one parent who has a university degree or higher.
All years 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Age 21 19 20 21 22 23
Male 47% 46% 46.7% 46.3% 47.6% 47%
White and non-hispanic 47% 48% 47.5% 47% 45.8% 46%
Living in a Metropolitan Area 77.5% 75.7% 76.3% 77.5% 78.8% 77.8%
Health Quality (1 to 5) 3.8 3.79 3.81 3.81 3.79 3.75
Max education: High School 74.5% 85% 81.2% 75.5% 72% 66%
Max education: University 16.5% 1.7% 7.5% 14.9% 20.4% 27.3%
Married 9% 3% 5% 8% 10.7% 13.8%
Max Parents Education: High School 58% 60% 58.5% 58.6% 58% 57.3%
Parents Education: University or more 15% 14% 15% 15.6% 15% 15.6%
Observations 6,440 695 1,078 1,493 1,796 1,378
Table 4.1.: Summary Statistics Demographics
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The purpose of the analysis is to study the consequences of the consumption of
marijuana, alcohol, and tobacco among adolescents. The survey asks several ques-
tions regarding the consumption of these substances (the questions are reported in
Appendix F). The binary variables used in this paper are constructed from the ques-
tions on consumption in the year of the interview. As table 4.2 shows, the average
proportion that used marijuana in the past year remains steady at around 30 percent,
with a similar trend of tobacco use. Alcohol use increases over time, growing from 62
to 82 percent. More interestingly, white non-hispanic respondents use of marijuana
decreases between 2005 and 2013, and a similar path can be observed for adolescents
above 20, despite the increase in age over time.8 Whites consume more alcohol and to-
bacco relative to the average consumption, but the consumption of cigarettes decreases
over time. This evidence suggests that demographics play a role in the consumption
of these products.
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
% Used Marijuana in the Last Year
On average 31 26 27 29 30
Male 37 31 33 36 38
White Non-Hispanic 38 33 32 31 31
Above 20 31 26 27 28 28
% Used Alcohol in the Last Year
On average 62 66 70 74 82
Male 64 65 70 68 74
White Non-Hispanic 75 73 75 75 83
Above 20 77 73 76 73 74
% Used Tobacco in the Last Year
On average 24 25 23 21 20
Male 26 27 27 24 23
White Non-Hispanic 29 28 25 22 20
Above 20 23 30 25 24 21
Observations 695 1,078 1,493 1,796 1,378
Table 4.2.: Descriptive Statistics by Use (in %).
Another key aspect of these substances is their addictive nature, which may create
persistence in consumption. Table 4.3 presents for each year the percentage of respon-
dents that consumed a substance also in the previous wave of interview. One can see
8The minimum legal drinking age in the US is 21.
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that around half of those that use any of the products between 2007 and 2013 consumed
them also in the previous wave, showing a persistent behavior that raises overtime for
all the products. This evidence suggests that habit formation is an important feature
that needs to be taken into account when estimating the consumption behavior for the
substances.
Year
Used in t-1 as % Use in t 2007 2009 2011 2013
Marijuana 46 42 49 63
Alcohol 53 55 63 73
Tobacco 45 50 64 69
Notes: The total numbers of individuals reporting the consumption
of the substances in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 are respectively: 275,
403, 517, 411 for marijuana; 659, 957, 1162, 979 for alcohol; 267, 339,
374, 268 for tobacco.
Table 4.3.: Persistent Use (Used in the Last Wave as % of Users in the Previous Year).
Table 4.4 points to the presence of multi-use of substances. Comparing table 4.2 and
table 4.4, less than half of the individuals who drink alcohol only use this substance.
The majority who use alcohol either use it with cannabis (14 percent), with cigarettes
(7 percent), or both (10 percent). Multi-substance use is even more pronounced for
cannabis use. For example in 2005, 31 percent report using cannabis, but only 2 percent
use it in isolation. Almost all cannabis users use it in combination with either alcohol or
alcohol and cigarettes. The trends over time for the bundles containing marijuana are
depicted in Figure 4.1. Notice that the use of marijuana consumed alone or with another
substance slightly increases or remains substantially stable between 2005 and 2013,
while the joint use of the three products (dot line) has a downwards slope. These simple
descriptive statistics indicate the importance of considering consumption decisions for
marijuana in combination with other substances.
Let us look at the correlation coecients between dummies for consuming pairs of
substances, displayed in table 4.5. The raw correlations between the substances are
signicantly positive at the 0.5 percent level. This suggests that an adolescent who
smokes is on average more likely to consume alcohol and marijuana. However one
cannot conclude from this that the substances are complement. It can be that those
consumers that like smoking cigarettes like also drinking and using marijuana. Simple
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Year
% Use in the Last Year All years 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
No Products 27.5 31 32 28 27 22
Marijuana Alone 2.4 2 1.8 2.1 3 2.7
Alcohol Alone 34 27.8 30.1 34 34.2 39.7
Tobacco Alone 3.2 3.4 3.8 3.3 3.4 2.3
Marijuana and Alcohol 14.2 15.7 11.7 12.9 14.8 16
Alcohol and Tobacco 7 7 9 7.4 6.4 6.1
Marijuana and Tobacco 1.8 1.4 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.9
All Products 9.8 11.8 10.3 9.8 9.2 9.2
Observations 6,440 695 1,078 1,493 1,796 1,378
Table 4.4.: Multi-Products Use (in %).
Figure 4.1.: Percentage Use Bundles Marijuana Over Time
evidence is given by the fact that for alcohol and tobacco the correlation disappears for
individuals with certain demographic characteristics (white, male and over 20) and for
marijuana and alcohol decreases drastically for individuals in the same group, while for
alcohol and tobacco the correlation is reduced by half for individuals with a university
degree. Once again, this shows that controlling for demographic characteristics is
important when evaluating the complementarity/substituability between products. It
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remains to see whether the rest of the correlation is due to complementarity or to
unobserved tastes.
Correlations Marijuana/Alcohol Alcohol/Tobacco Marijuana/Tobacco
Raw 0.2621* 0.1334* 0.2931*
White, Male, Over 20 0.0949* -0.0025 0.267*
Max Education: University 0.2016* 0.0692* 0.2654*
Living in a Metropolitan Area 0.2702* 0.1355* 0.291*
Table 4.5.: Pearson Correlation Coecients (signicant 0.5 %)
4.2.2. Marijuana Regulation
There are important distinctions between marijuana decriminalization and legaliza-
tion. Decriminalization consists of removing criminal penalties imposed for personal
marijuana use. However, the production and sale of marijuana remain illegal, therefore
it is still necessary to seek out suppliers in order to purchase the drug.9 With legalization
instead, laws banning the possession and personal use of marijuana are abolished or
lifted. More importantly, the government can regulate and tax marijuana use and sales.
The purpose of the analysis is to study the consequences of marijuana legalization. The
sample period ends in 2013 and it does not cover the years of legalization. The data
collected contain also state-level information on decriminalization.
In the US, the legalization of marijuana for recreational use started in 2012 with Col-
orado and Washington.10 Alaska, Oregon and District of Columbia, implemented the
same law in fall 2014, followed by Ohio in 2015. On November 8, 2016, adult-use recre-
ational marijuana was approved in four other states (California, Maine, Massachusetts
and Nevada). In 2018, Michigan voters approved to legalize, regulate, and tax marijuana
in the state; in the same year, Vermont legalized marijuana for adult use, and the law
9As of April 2020, the non-medical use of cannabis is decriminalized in 16 states, whereas 9 states
have decriminalized and later legalized it. Oregon was the rst state to decriminalize marijuana in 1973,
followed by Alaska, Maine, Colorado, California and Ohio in 1975. Decriminalization laws passed in
Minnesota (1976), Mississippi (1977), New York (1977), North Carolina (1977), and Nebraska (1978), so
that by the end of the 70s, 11 states in total decriminalized marijuana. A second wave of decriminalization
began in 2001 with Nevada, followed by Massachusetts (2008), Connecticut (2011), Rhode Island (2012),
Vermont (2013). Between 2014 and 2019, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, Delaware, Illinois,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota and Hawaii passed the law. In 2020, Virginia has adopted
the same law.
10For those States, the actual sales started in 2014.
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became eective in July. Very recently, on January 1, 2020, marijuana sales became
legal in Illinois.
Moreover, twenty-one States considered bills for marijuana legalization in 2018.11
The MORE (Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement) Act, which the
Judiciary Committee passed in November 2019, proposes unied federal legislation to
legalize cannabis. This suggests that in the near future more states will move in the
direction of legalizing marijuana.
4.2.3. Prices
The pricing data for marijuana, alcohol, and cigarettes come from multiple sources.
For alcohol and cigarette prices, we use administrative tax data. In particular, we use
state exercise taxes placed on beer in the state of the individual interviewed, as beer is
one of the most used alcoholic beverages among adolescents. All taxes are in dollars
per gallon and are obtained from the Tax Foundation.12 Cigarette prices are computed
as a percentage of retail prices. We use the weighted (by market share) average prices
per package.13
Marijuana prices are more dicult to nd as marijuana is an illicit drug. We combine
information from two dierent data sources, the High Times and PriceOfWeed.com.
The High Times is a monthly magazine that publishes the prices of marijuana with
the corresponding strain for multiple cities and states across the US.14 These data are
from 2004 to 2011. PriceOfWeed.com is a website that “crowd-sources” the street
value of marijuana from the consumers. Site visitors anonymously input information
about their most recent marijuana transactions: amount purchased, price and quality,
choosing from low, medium, or high, together with data on the city, state, and country
where the transaction took place.15 These data are from September 2010 to September
2013.
11National Conference of State Legislators. Published October 17, 2019 at https://www.ncsl.org/
research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx.
12https://taxfoundation.org/state-sales-gasoline-cigarette-and-alcohol-tax-rates
13Generic brands are included in the average calculation. Column 2 of Tables 13B, The Tax Burden
on Tobacco, 2014. Each value is calculated as of November 1 of the corresponding year.
14This is in the section Trans High Market Quotations.
15Data source used also in Davis, Geisler, and Nichols (2016). In particular, we use a cleaned version
of the data available on https://github.com/rlucioni/viz/tree/master/marijuana/data.
84
Given that the price of marijuana can vary a lot by quality, we include an index
to capture the quality of the marijuana products in each state and year of observa-
tion. This index is constructed in the following way. For the data collected on the
High Times, we use the information on marijuana strains to classify the purchase into
high quality and low quality. To do so, we collect information on the level of delta-
9-tetrahydrocannabinol (or THC) for each strain from multiple websites. THC is the
major psychoactive chemical compound in marijuana. The amount of THC absorbed
by marijuana users diers according to the part of the plant that is used (e.g., leaf, head),
the way the plant is cultivated (e.g., hydro), and the method used to imbibe the drug.16
We classify marijuana strains with a level of THC above 15 percent as high-quality.
When the level of THC is below 15 percent, we classied them as low-quality. For
instance, skunk, haze, kind and crack contain a high level of THC while schwag and
mids have a low level of THC.17 Out of 1,454 unique strains, 1,153 are classied in terms
of quality, and the remaining 301 are dropped from the sample as the amount of THC
contained cannot be determined.18
To be consistent with the above-mentioned classication, for the data collected from
PriceOfWeed.com, the transactions of medium quality are redened to be low-quality
transactions, so that we have purchases of low and high marijuana quality for the whole
sample.19 Based on this information, we construct an index of high-quality cannabis
given by the percentage of high-quality marijuana purchases for each state and year
of observation.
The combined dataset consists of around 138,000 observations for marijuana prices
and quality, from 2005 to 2013. In our estimation, we use the price per gram for each
state/year combination, by averaging over the months and cities.20 Unfortunately, we
16These include the following websites (where we include only the portion before “.com”) weedsmok-
ersguide, marijuana-strains, organicann, dutch-passion, marijuana-seeds-weed, wikileaf, seednder,
allbud, thebcsc, budderweeds, urbandictionary, leay, cannasos, buddyboybrands, cannafo, cannabisre-
ports, wikipedia, coloradocannabistours, libertycannabis, marijuanabreak, naturalcannabis, and medi-
calmarijuanastrains.
17Low-THC marijuana strains include also reggie, commercial, ditch weed, dirt, brick bud, shake,
wack, bunk.
18These observations represent only the 0.3% of the entire sample.
19Because of some inconsistencies in prices and quality classication, we changed around 120 obser-
vations from low/medium into high quality.
20Observations include amounts in eighths (3.5 grams), quarters (7 grams), half ounces (14 grams),
and ounces (28 grams). As pointed out by Davis et al. (2016), the limited range of reported quantities
minimizes the price dierences related to quantity discounts such as those found by Clements (2006).
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do not observe prices in all years and states. To deal with missings, we use linear
interpolation when we observe the prices in other years for the same state.
In table 4.6 we show descriptive statistics for cigarette prices, alcohol tax rates,
marijuana prices, and the ratio of high-quality marijuana, across all states and years
of observations. The average marijuana price is 12 dollars per gram and on average
around 70% of marijuana transactions involved are reported as high quality.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max Observations
Cigarettes Price ($/package) 5.12 1.38 4.94 3.04 10.03 250
Beer Tax ($/gallon) 0.29 0.25 0.2 0.02 1.17 250
Marijuana Price ($/gram) 12.06 2.42 11.68 1.76 21.16 250
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.72 0.22 0.7 0 1 250
Notes: Each observation is a combination of state and year. The District of Columbia is
excluded.
Table 4.6.: Descriptive statistics prices and marijuana quality
The trend in the average marijuana price is shown in gure 4.2. The average price
ranges from 11.2 to 13.5 price per gram between 2005 and 2013. One can see that
the price decreases after 2009. This most likely reects the quality trend, depicted in
gure 4.3. Indeed, starting in 2009, there is a drop in the average ratio of high-quality
marijuana.
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Figure 4.3.: High Quality Marijuana
Distinguishing between prices for high and low-quality marijuana (gure 4.4), one
can see that the average price for high-quality marijuana (yellow line) exhibits a down-
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ward trend over time, whereas the contrary is true for the low-quality marijuana average
price (dark line).21
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Figure 4.4.: Low and High Price Marijuana
4.3. Model
We model an individual’s choice to consume marijuana, alcohol or cigarettes (and
possible combinations of these products) over time, in the spirit of Gentzkow (2007).
Dierently from Gentzkow (2007), we incorporate persistence in consumption behavior
because of the potentially addictive nature of the substances.
Individual i, for i “ t1, ..., Nu, chooses whether to consume good j P t1, ..., Ju
and whether to consume this product together with other products in market m, for
m “ t1, ...,Mu. Denote the set of consumption bundles of product j at time t by rt P
t0, ..., 2J ´1uwhere the bundles are ordered such that rt “ 0 refers to no consumption
(i.e., an empty bundle) and rt P r1, Js refers to a bundle that contains only good j “ r.
The indirect utility of i consuming j in market m at time t is given by
uijmt “ ´αjpjmt ` 1pj P rt´1qδj `Ditpij `Xmtλj ` vij. (4.1)
21Allocca et al. (2020) exploit the quality information contained in this reach dataset to construct
an empirical price distribution (in the spirit of Jacobi and Sovinsky (2016)) for low and high-quality
marijuana price that an individual faces. This method adds variation in terms of individual probability
of use, based on the quality available in the market.
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In this expression, pjmt is the price of good j. Notice that the market prices for cigarettes
and alcohol are observables; given that marijuana is an illicit product, we use the
average marijuana prices by state from the data gathered.
An individual’s decision to consume sin good j depends also on whether she con-
sumed it last period (captured by 1pj P rt´1q). Therefore, the vector δj can be considered
as a proxy of addiction that may be dierent for dierent substances and it is constant
across time. We assume that the consumption of product j can be directly inuenced
by the past consumption of the same product but not by the past consumption of other
products. However, the consumption of bundles containing two or three products can
be inuenced by the past consumption of each of the products in the bundles.
The vector Dit includes observed demographic characteristics which can inuence
use, such as gender, age, education variables, and health status. The parameter vector
pij allows for demographics to inuence use dierently depending on the substance.
Xmt includes all the market-specic variables, the year in which the substance was
purchased, the quality of marijuana available in the market, and whether marijuana is
decriminalized in that market (this is important as there are dierent levels of enforce-
ment for substance-related crimes and these may change across years). The parameter
vector that captures the impact of the market variables, λj, varies by substance.
The idiosyncratic term vij represents the unobserved heterogeneity that may inu-
ence a person’s choice of smoking cigarettes, drinking, or using marijuana.22 Because
unobserved heterogeneity is person-specic and likely to be correlated across the three
products, we assume that the random eects are distributed tri-variate normal with
symmetric covariance matrix.
Notice that our model allows for persistence in consumption so, as in all models of
dynamics, we need to consider the initial period of consumption. One way to address
this is to allow the mean of the unobserved eects to be a function of some data that
are relevant in an initial period (for example, the age at which the individual rst tried
marijuana). We discuss both of these issues in detail in the following section.
22Gentzkow (2007) introduces also a time-varying idiosyncratic term to rationalize the remaining
unexplained variation. In our context, this term could potentially capture time-specic shocks which
aect the consumption of all the substances in the same way, like for instance a yearly shock in the
health condition of the respondent. Notice that we include in our regression a variable related to health,
which can partially explain this variation. The potentially unexplained time variation still present will
be captured by a time-individual-bundle specic error term.
88
Individuals obtain an indirect utility from consuming the goods in combination.
Again, following Gentzkow (2007), the utility an individual obtains from consuming
bundle r is given by
uirmt “
ÿ
SjPrt
uijmt ` γr ` irmt (4.2)
where the Sj P rt denotes the set of goods containing j that belong to bundle r.
We assume that the idiosyncratic terms irmt follow a normal distribution. Notice
that the consumption of bundles containing two or three products can be inuenced
directly by the past consumption of each of the products in the bundles. There may
be heterogeneity that we do not observe in the data that inuences choices and has
a persistent nature. This is captured by the idiosyncratic terms. The utility from the
outside option of consuming none of the products is ui0mt “ i0mt where all non-
stochastic terms are normalized to zero because we cannot identify relative utility
levels.
We are interested in measuring the substitutability among alcohol pAq, cigarettes
pCq, and marijuana pMq. Notice that in this framework, we assume that each individual
has free access to marijuana. Denote by γr the interaction term that relates to the
substitutability among the products in bundle r.23
The interaction terms between pairs are γAM , γAC , γMC and the interaction among
all three goods is given by γACM . Gentzkow (2006) shows (under certain regularity
conditions) that the substitutability between two goods (sayA andC) can be expressed
as the sum of a direct component γAC and an indirect component which has the same
sign as the product γAM γMC .
When γACM is negative (positive) the two goods are substitutes (complements);
when it is zero the two goods are independent. Substitutability between the pairs
tA,Mu and tM,Cu is measured by an analogous sum of the direct and indirect terms.
4.4. Econometric Methodology
At each time period a subject can consume any combination of marijuana, alcohol
and tobacco, or none. Denote by yitm “ r a categorical outcome variable that reects
consumption of bundle r of products from j P J , where J “ t1pmq, 2paq, 3ptqu is
23When goods are not consumed in combination γr “ 0.
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the set containing the products marijuana, alcohol and tobacco. To simplify the dis-
cussion of the econometric model, dene the set of consumption bundles r P R as
R “ t1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7u, where
R “
$’’’’’’’’’’’&’’’’’’’’’’’%
1 marijuana
2 alcohol
3 cigarettes
4 marijuana, alcohol
5 marijuana, cigarettes
6 alcohol,cigarettes
7 marijuana, alcohol, cigarettes
(4.3)
and r “ 0 is the base category of no substance consumption. The set RM dene the
bundles containing marijuana and the restricted set RR of bundles without marijuana
use.
The observed choice yitm “ r is modelled in terms of the bundle utilities uirmt as
yitm “
#
r if uirmt ą maxtu´rirmt, 0u
0 otherwise
(4.4)
where uirmt is dened as in equation (1) in terms of the product specic utilities u¯ijmt
of the products contained in bundle r and bundle eects γr for bundles with more than
one product. For simpler notation, let us rewrite the latent utility for bundle r as
uirmt “
ÿ
jPr
px1imtβj ` pijmtα ` νijq ` Irr ą Jsγr ` irmt “ µirmt ` εirmt (4.5)
where ximt “ pIpj P rt´1q, Dit, Xmtq and βj “ pδj, pij, λjq. The γr parameters are
mean shifter and adjust the intercept either up or down reecting that goods are com-
plements or substitutes respectively. Note that Xmt contains all but rst year controls
so that we can include a constant as rst element of the demographics vector Dit and
the intercept as rst element of pij . The unobservables terms νij capture time constant
consumer characteristics. Following Gentzkow (2007), we assume that the J ˆ 1 vec-
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tor of individual eects follows a multivariate Normal distribution νi „ Np0,Ωq. For
identication purposes, we restrict the covariance matrix to be
Ω “
¨˚
˝ 1 σ1 σ2σ1 1 σ3
σ2 σ3 1
‹˛‚
The inclusion of random eect gives rise to initial conditions problem as one cannot
assume that the decision to consume a substance at t “ 0 is uncorrelated with the
unobserved individual eects νi “ tνi1, νi2, νi3u. We follow Wooldridge (2002) that
builds upon Chamberlain (1984) and model the mean of the random eects as a function
of initial value yi0 and time-invariant covariates.24
We dene a joint distribution of the unobserved random eects for good νi as
νi „ Npµνi ,Ωq (4.6)
where the means are dened as µνij “ γj1yi0 ` x¯1γj2 and depend on the starting age
for the use of substance j, yi0, and the average of time-varying demographics/controls
over the sample x¯. For marijuana consumption, yi0 includes the age when i started
using marijuana. However, the PSID does not contain such information for alcohol and
smoking, so we include the behavior observed in the rst period of the data for these
two substances.
Under the multinomial probit model, the R ˆ 1 vector of latent bundle utilities
uimt “ pui1mt, ui2mt, ..., uiRmtq for subject i is then given by
uimt “ µimt ` imt , imt „ Np0,Σq (4.7)
with the mean vector dened asµimt “ pµ1rmt, ..., µ7rmtq. The error vector imt follows
a multivariate Normal distribution with covariance matrix Σ. Since we capture the
correlation across bundles via product-specic individual random eect, Σ is a diagonal
24For instance, Wooldridge (2005) discusses how the random component of the xed eect then can
be integrated out to yield the likelihood function of the random eects probit model.
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matrix σ ˚ IRˆR. For identication purposed we set σ11 “ 1 (see for example Geweke
and Keane 1994). Under these assumptions, the likelihood in terms of latent utilities is
fpumt, ymt|θ, νq “
ź
i
ź
t
ż
Ar
Npuimt|µimtq duimt
where the integration region is given by Ar “ tuirmt ą maxt0, ui´rmtu : r P Ru.
4.5. Identification
Imagine we observe consumers using marijuana, cigarettes and alcohol together.
One possibility is that these products are complements. Another could be that an indi-
vidual has unobserved tastes for marijuana, alcohol and cigarettes that are correlated,
such as a taste for feeling high, which is constant over time. Gentzkow (2006, 2007) pro-
vide an extensive discussion of how to separately identify the substitution/complement
parameter (γ) from the unobserved covariance.
Exclusion restrictions, namely something that impacts the utility of one product but
not the other product, is one source of identication. In our analysis, prices represent
valid exclusion restrictions. For example, if the fact that many individuals consume
marijuana together with alcohol is driven by complementarity, the prices will inuence
the consumption of these products.
Another source of identication comes from the panel data. We assume that cor-
relation in the unobservable tastes do not vary over time,25 therefore the panel data
aspect of the PSID allows us to separate complementarity in purchases from correlation
in unobservables. The idea is that the choices in previous time periods will be more
correlated with the choices at time t the larger the variance of the random eects.
A common concern in discrete choice models of product choice is that there is some
component not included in the utility function (such as quality) which enters the error
term. To the extent that prices are correlated with quality, this presents a potential
endogeneity problem.
25This assumption might sound non-obvious for bundles with marijuana, given that the unobservable
taste may vary over time because of changes in the regulation. In our analysis, we control for these
changes, including dummies for decriminalization or legalization.
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We have three products with associated prices - alcohol, cigarettes, and marijuana.
Price endogeneity is less of an issue in our framework. First, we are modeling the
decision to consume a substance, but not which brand of the substance. Given that, the
price is applicable to all brands of that substance, namely the tax rate, and it is plausibly
not correlated with quality. Second, for marijuana we include a control for quality in
the consumer’s utility function, using the information we gather on the amount of
high-quality marijuana observed in each year/state observation.
4.6. Results
In this section, we present results from several regressions where we show the
importance of past consumption and we measure the degree of substitution across
products.
4.6.1. Preliminary Regressions
We start by analyzing the results from preliminary regressions where we do not
consider the use of the substances in combination. The dependent variables are dum-
mies for the consumption of alcohol, tobacco and marijuana. We include product-level
characteristics, demographic characteristics, and xed eects.
Table 4.7 presents results from standard probit regressions. Notice that we do not
take into consideration the panel nature of the data, and we treat every observation as
independent. Nevertheless, the coecient estimates provide information on what may
impact the use of the three substances.
In particular, for each product, specication (1) includes product and individual
characteristics and year xed eects. Not surprisingly, alcohol and cigarette prices aect
negatively the probability of drinking and smoking respectively. The price of marijuana
comes out not signicant. This is probably related to the fact that we do not observe
individual prices.26 Male and white non-hispanic are more likely to consume a drug,
while the contrary holds for married people. All demographics inuence in the same
direction the use of marijuana, alcohol and tobacco, except for the education variables:
26Allocca et al. (2020) deal with this issue by simulating individual prices using empirical price
distributions for high and low-quality marijuana.
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for marijuana and tobacco, having a high school or a university degree impacts in a
signicantly negative way the probability of using the substances, whereas for alcohol
this impact is signicantly positive.
In specication (2) we exclude the variables related to individual education and
include parental education. One can see that having a parent with a university de-
gree increases the probability of drinking but decreases the probability of smoking.
Specication (3) includes all the regressors used in the previous specications and fur-
ther controls for region xed eects. There are no signicant changes relative to the
previous specications.
Marijuana Use Alcohol Use Tobacco Use
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Product Charachteristics
Marijuana Price -0.001(0.01)
-0.003
(0.01)
-0.009
(0.01)
Alcohol Price (Beer Tax) -0.295***(0.0727)
-0.284***
(0.073)
0.067
(0.09)
Cigarette Price (Package) -0.076***(0.0197)
-0.07***
(0.02)
-0.047*
(0.026)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.09***(0.036)
0.075***
(0.036)
0.081**
(0.039)
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.237(0.16)
0.26
(0.16)
0.295
(0.19)
Demographics
Age 0.02***(0.008)
-0.01
(0.008)
0.02***
(0.008)
0.124***
(0.0086)
0.141***
(0.0082)
0.13***
(0.0087)
0.104***
(0.009)
0.063***
(0.0085)
0.1***
(0.009)
Male 0.39***(0.034)
0.405***
(0.034)
0.39***
(0.034)
0.278***
(0.034)
0.244**
(0.034)
0.268***
(0.034)
0.21***
(0.037)
0.266***
(0.037)
0.23***
(0.037)
White Non-Hispanic 0.347***(0.035)
0.294***
(0.035)
0.321***
(0.037)
0.5953***
(0.0362)
0.613***
(0.0361)
0.527***
(0.037)
0.412***
(0.0394)
0.322***
(0.039)
0.45***
(0.042)
Health Quality (1 to 5) -0.134***(0.018)
-0.147***
(0.019)
-0.136***
(0.018)
-0.096***
(0.019)
-0.086***
(0.019)
-0.103***
(0.019)
-0.247***
(0.02)
-0.27***
(0.02)
-0.24***
(0.02)
Married -0.739***(0.074)
-0.73***
(0.074)
-0.73***
(0.074)
-0.447***
(0.0625)
-0.426***
(0.062)
-0.422***
(0.063)
-0.173***
(0.07)
-0.195***
(0.067)
-0.22***
(0.069)
Max education: High School -0.296***(0.058)
-0.305***
(0.058)
0.284***
(0.0587)
0.243***
(0.06)
-0.872***
(0.058)
-0.82***
(0.059)
Max education: University -0.511***(0.075)
-0.528***
(0.075)
0.593***
(0.076)
0.527***
(0.077)
-1.71***
(0.085)
-1.59***
(0.086)
Max Parents Education: High School 0.024(0.04)
-0.006
(0.04)
-0.097**
(0.04)
-0.055
(0.041)
0.477***
(0.046)
0.39***
(0.047)
Parents Education: University or more 0.04(0.054)
0.05
(0.054)
0.25***
(0.0557)
0.238***
(0.0564)
-0.124*
(0.066)
-0.093
(0.067)
Region xed eects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Number of obs: 6,440. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All specications include year xed eects and a constant. ***p<0.01, **p<0.5, *p<0.1.
Table 4.7.: Standard Probit Regressions
Table 4.8 presents results from dynamic probit models for marijuana, tobacco and
alcohol consumption. These regressions use the information on the behavior for all
the periods, thus the sample size is reduced (1,945 individuals for which we observe
consumption choices for at least two periods of time). For all the substances, past
behavior is a positive signicant indicator of current behavior, and these eects hold
94
after controlling for initial conditions à la Wooldridge (2005) (specications (2) for each
substance). This suggests that persistence in behavior is an important factor to consider
when analyzing the use of legal and illegal substances. Control variables related to age,
gender, race, health condition, and marital status have the same eect found in Table
4.7 on the probability of use. However, in contrast to the results of the previous table,
when we include the initial conditions, having a high school degree or a university
degree decreases not only the probability of smoking or consuming marijuana but also
the probability of drinking.
4.6.2. Multi-Substance Use Regressions
As we are interested in the possible complementarity/substitutability among sub-
stances, we then estimate the model of multi-substance use where individuals make
choices among all bundles, allowing thus for correlation among errors in choices.
We rst run a multinomial probit regression of multi-substance use to estimate the
choice probabilities implied by equation 4.2 without considering habit formation. The
results of table 4.9 show that substance use is less likely the higher are the prices. Con-
cerning marijuana usage, individuals who live in a decriminalized state (note this is
before legalization) are more likely to use marijuana. We also see that demographic
characteristics matter but not necessarily in the same direction for all products. For
example, having a university degree increases the probability of using alcohol alone or
together with marijuana but decreases the probability of choosing the other bundles.
Moreover, individuals who have higher educated parents are more likely to drink al-
cohol or use marijuana but less likely to smoke cigarettes. The constant terms for the
bundles of pairs represent the direct substitution eects. For any pair of substances,
these eects are negative. However, we cannot conclude that goods are substitutes, as
we have to look also at the indirect eect. As discussed earlier, the sign of the indirect
eect is given by the sign of the product of the other two interaction terms. In all
the cases, the indirect eects are positive. Once we compute the bundle interactions
following Gentzkow (2007), we nd that all the products in pairs are complements, as
the γs are positive.27
27For each bundle of pairs, these eects are computed by subtracting the estimated constants for the
bundles of products consumed alone to the estimated constant of the pair bundles.
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Marijuana Use Alcohol Use Tobacco Use
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Lagged Use
Marijuana Use Last Period 1.5***(0.0526)
1.09***
(0.086)
Alcohol Use Last Period 1.14***(0.062)
0.66***
(0.095)
Smoker Last Period 1.93***(0.075)
0.573***
(0.148)
Product Characteristics
Marijuana Price -0.018(0.018)
-0.006
(0.022)
Alcohol Price (Beer Tax) -0.2(0.122)
0.216
(0.15)
Cigarette Price (Package) -0.018(0.035)
0.004
(0.06)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.079(0.052)
0.068
(0.069)
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.507*(0.271)
0.413
(0.332)
Demographics
Age -0.009(0.012)
-0.0028
(0.034)
0.02
(0.014)
0.0225
(0.0336)
0.049***
(0.014)
0.092*
(0.05)
Male 0.3***(0.048)
0.39***
(0.064)
0.224***
(0.051)
0.287***
(0.066)
0.177**
(0.066)
0.33***
(0.104)
White Non-Hispanic 0.15***(0.052)
0.238***
(0.071)
0.447***
(0.0583)
0.478***
(0.072)
0.17***
(0.066)
0.24**
(0.113)
Health Quality (1 to 5) -0.103***(0.025)
-0.026
(0.047)
-0.108***
(0.027)
-0.128***
(0.045)
-0.173***
(0.035)
-0.188**
(0.059)
Married -0.508***(0.095)
-0.555***
(0.124)
-0.381***
(0.0752)
-0.407***
(0.091)
-0.155**
(0.08)
-0.221
(0.138)
Max education: High School -0.155*(0.081)
-0.256
(0.224)
0.273***
(0.084)
-0.708***
(0.224)
-0.377***
(0.117)
-0.616*
(0.32)
Max education: University -0.37***(0.099)
-0.591***
(0.257)
0.50***
(0.101)
-0.522***
(0.251)
-0.89***
(0.177)
-0.76**
(0.37)
Max Parents Education: High School -0.025(0.055)
0.015
(0.073)
-0.109*
(0.059)
-0.127*
(0.075)
0.19***
(0.073)
0.227*
(0.125)
Parents Education: University or more 0.047(0.071)
0.117
(0.096)
0.241***
(0.004)
0.267**
(0.104)
-0.128
(0.073)
-0.27
(0.176)
Initial conditions included No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of obs: 4,486. Number of individuals: 1,954. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
All specications include region and year xed eects, a constant and individual panel-level variance.
***p<0.01, **p<0.5, *p<0.1.
The initial conditions specications include the mean over time of all time varying regressors.
Table 4.8.: Dynamic Probit Regressions
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Variable OnlyMarij
Only
Tobacco
Only
Alcohol
Tobacco
& Marij
Alcohol
& Marij
Alcohol
& Tobacco
Use
All
Product Charachteristics
Marijuana Price 0.00286(0.0112)
0.00286
(0.0112)
0.00286
(0.0112)
0.00286
(0.0112)
Alcohol Price (Beer Tax) -0.291***(0.0804)
-0.291***
(0.0804)
-0.291***
(0.0804)
-0.291***
(0.0804)
Cigarette Price (Package) -0.0774***(0.0474)
-0.0774***
(0.0474)
-0.0774***
(0.0474)
-0.0774***
(0.0474)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.103***(0.0393)
0.103***
(0.0393)
0.103***
(0.0393)
0.103***
(0.0393)
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.26(0.173)
0.26
(0.173)
0.26
(0.173)
0.26
(0.173)
Demographics
Age -0.0148***(0.00695)
0.0906***
(0.00947)
0.124***
(0.009)
0.0757***
(0.012)
0.109***
(0.0114)
0.214***
(0.012)
0.2***
(0.0141)
Male 0.352***(0.0384)
0.114***
(0.0408)
0.201***
(0.0387)
0.466***
(0.0512)
0.553***
(0.0491)
0.315***
(0.0541)
0.667***
(0.0577)
White Non-Hispanic 0.161***(0.0406)
0.393***
(0.0435)
0.532***
(0.0411)
0.554***
(0.0545)
0.693***
(0.0522)
0.925***
(0.0579)
1.086***
(0.0618)
Health Quality (1 to 5) -0.0688***(0.0198)
-0.229***
(0.0215)
-0.0756***
(0.0205)
-0.298***
(0.0272)
-0.144***
(0.0263)
-0.304***
(0.0283)
-0.373***
(0.0309)
Married -0.471***(0.201)
-0.0581
(0.140)
-0.245***
(0.0879)
-0.286
(0.185)
-1.005***
(0.123)
-0.243**
(0.11)
-1.237***
(0.146)
Max education: High School -0.173***(0.0621)
-0.843***
(0.0617)
0.395***
(0.0606)
-1.016***
(0.0792)
0.223***
(0.0801)
-0.447***
(0.0835)
-0.62***
(0.0913)
Max education: University -0.406***(0.0871)
-1.708***
(0.0948)
0.912***
(0.0881)
-2.115***
(0.119)
0.506***
(0.111)
-0.796***
(0.122)
-1.203***
(0.131)
Max Parents Education: High School 0.287***(0.111)
0.318***
(0.103)
-0.0784
(0.0591)
0.606***
(0.146)
-0.202***
(0.0677)
0.474***
(0.0861)
0.239***
(0.0774)
Parents Education: University or more 0.342**(0.153)
-0.608**
(0.253)
0.329***
(0.0815)
0.141
(0.24)
0.257***
(0.0902)
0.158
(0.128)
0.205*
(0.109)
Constant Terms
-1.45***
(0.119)
-1.562***
(0.228)
-2.591***
(0.205)
-1.935***
(0.3)
-2.865***
(0.263)
-4.001***
(0.275)
-3.395***
(0.344)
Bundle Interactions (γ) 1.077*** 1.176*** 0.152***
Number of obs: 6,440. Standard errors in parenthesis. Included are year xed eects. ***p<0.01, **p<0.5, *p<0.1.
Table 4.9.: Multinomial Probit Regressions
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Finally, in table 4.10 we present results from a multinomial probit model where
we include lagged values of the dependent variables. For these regressions, we use
panel-adjusted standard errors clustered at the individual level. We continue to nd
a signicant impact of past behavior on the consumption of single products, which
is not surprising, but past behavior of a substance now impacts also the consumption
of bundles containing the substance. The estimates on demographics are consistent
with those of table 4.9. However, notice that the coecient on marijuana price is now
negative, though not signicant. Once again, the direct substitution eects are negative,
whereas the bundle interactions have positive signs, meaning that products in pairs
are complements in use.
Appendix G presents additional estimates from multivariate probit regressions. In
conclusion, our results show that it is important to control for correlation in unobserv-
ables for the choices of consuming the sin goods in combination. Controlling for past
use also inuences the degree of complementarity/substitutability of the products.
4.7. Conclusion
As illicit substances move into legal product space, substitution patterns with legal
products become more salient. Two-thirds of Americans are in favor of marijuana
legalization. In this paper, we make the rst step to assess the impact of marijuana
legalization on the consumption of potentially addictive sin goods, as marijuana might
be consumed together with other substances.
Specically, we study an individual’s choice to consume marijuana, alcohol or
cigarettes, and possible combinations of these products, allowing for persistence in
behavior. We combine longitudinal data from the PSID survey (2005-2013) with pricing
data for the three substances to estimate the parameters associated with the consump-
tion decisions in the context of a dynamic model of multi-substance use. We show that
it is important to control for unobserved correlation across behaviors and persistence
in use to evaluate the potential complementarities among substances. We nd that the
past consumption has an impact on the current use of the drug consumed alone and in
combination with other sin goods.
With this research we contribute to the literature on bundling and participate to
the current debate on the eects of marijuana legalization. Some important caveats
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Variable OnlyMarij
Only
Tobacco
Only
Alcohol
Tobacco
& Marij
Alcohol
& Marij
Alcohol
& Tobacco
Use
All
Lagged Use
Marijuana Use Last Period 1.375***(0.0631)
1.375***
(0.0631)
1.375***
(0.0631)
1.375***
(0.0631)
Alcohol Use Last Period 1.004***(0.0597)
1.004***
(0.0597)
1.004***
(0.0597)
1.004***
(0.0597)
Smoker Last Period 1.841***(0.0756)
1.841***
(0.0756)
1.841***
(0.0756)
1.841***
(0.0756)
Product Charachteristics
Marijuana Price -0.00005(0.0155)
-0.00005
(0.0155)
-0.00005
(0.0155)
-0.00005
(0.0155)
Alcohol Price (Beer Tax) -0.128(0.111)
-0.128
(0.111)
-0.128
(0.111)
-0.128
(0.111)
Cigarette Price (Package) -0.0615***(0.0285)
-0.0615***
(0.0285)
-0.0615***
(0.0285)
-0.0615***
(0.0285)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.0697(0.0535)
0.0697
(0.0535)
0.0697
(0.0535)
0.0697
(0.0535)
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.267(0.235)
0.267
(0.235)
0.267
(0.235)
0.267
(0.235)
Demographics
Age -0.0148(0.0098)
0.0632***
(0.014)
0.126***
(0.0133)
0.0484***
(0.0169)
0.111***
(0.0169)
0.189***
(0.0183)
0.174***
(0.0216)
Male 0.243***(0.0519)
0.0707
(0.0558)
0.179***
(0.0518)
0.314***
(0.0704)
0.422***
(0.0672)
0.250***
(0.0725)
0.493***
(0.0789)
White Non-Hispanic 0.102**(0.055)
0.208***
(0.061)
0.422***
(0.0552)
0.309***
(0.0764)
0.523***
(0.0695)
0.629***
(0.0795)
0.731***
(0.0854)
Health Quality (1 to 5) -0.053*(0.029)
-0.158***
(0.0308)
-0.0572**
(0.0286)
-0.211***
(0.0387)
-0.11***
(0.0383)
-0.216***
(0.0419)
-0.269***
(0.046)
Married -0.196(0.238)
-0.0644
(0.189)
-0.134
(0.115)
-0.406
(0.297)
-0.870***
(0.168)
-0.137
(0.148)
-1.101***
(0.2)
Max education: High School -0.161*(0.0867)
-0.508***
(0.0919)
0.348***
(0.0896)
-0.669***
(0.113)
0.187
(0.119)
-0.160
(0.128)
-0.321***
(0.139)
Max education: University -0.359***(0.121)
-1.11***
(0.138)
0.789***
(0.129)
-1.468***
(0.17)
0.439***
(0.156)
-0.312*
(0.181)
-0.671***
(0.189)
Max Parents Education: High School 0.366**(0.146)
0.332**
(0.153)
-0.0517
(0.0769)
0.663***
(0.235)
-0.165*
(0.088)
0.328***
(0.112)
0.150
(0.108)
Parents Education: University or more 0.0364(0.225)
-0.817*
(0.422)
0.308***
(0.105)
0.11
(0.415)
0.196*
(0.117)
0.207
(0.164)
0.176
(0.154)
Constant Terms
-1.943***
(0.176)
-2.242***
(0.329)
-3.327***
(0.298)
-3.209***
(0.451)
-4.068***
(0.39)
-5.239***
(0.421)
-5.264***
(0.519)
Bundle Interactions (γ) 0.976*** 1.202*** 0.33***
Number of obs: 4,486. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (adjusted for 1,954 clusters). Included are year xed eects.
***p<0.01, **p<0.5, *p<0.1.
Table 4.10.: Multinomial Probit Regressions with Lags
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need to be mentioned: rst, we do not observe individual prices for marijuana; second,
we do not consider who has access to marijuana. To make a clear welfare assessment,
one would need a full structural empirical model where these aspects are incorporated.
The parameter estimates can inform the policy debate regarding the long-run impact of
the legalization of marijuana by considering the concurrent and future eect on other
potentially substitutable products.
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F. estions on consumption of
substances PSID
Question Values
Marijuana
Have you ever taken marijuana? Yes/No
On how many occasions have you used marijuana in your lifetime?
1-2 occasions
3-5 occasions
6-9 occasions
10-19 occasions
20-39 occasions
40 or more occasions
On how many occasions (if any) have you used marijuana in the past 12 months?
1-2 occasions
3-5 occasions
6-9 occasions
10-19 occasions
20-39 occasions
40 or more occasions
On how many occasions (if any) have you used marijuana in the past 30 days?
1-2 occasions
3-5 occasions
6-9 occasions
10-19 occasions
20-39 occasions
40 or more occasions
Smoking
Did you ever smoke cigarettes? Yes/No
Do you smoke cigarettes? Yes/No
Drinking
Do you ever drink any alcoholic beverages such as beer, wine, or liquor? Yes/No
In the last year, on average, how often did you have any alcohol to drink?
Less than once a month
About once a month
Several times a month
About once a week
Several times a week
Every day
Table F.1.: Original Questions from the TAS survey.
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G. Other Regressions
In this Appendix, we show results from multivariate probit models. The rst three
columns of table G.1 present results from a model which considers that the choices
are made together (and errors are correlated across products) but does not explicitly
consider choices of product bundles. In the second three columns we allow for indi-
viduals to make choices among all bundles. The results indicate that demographic
characteristics matter when choosing which substances to use but not necessarily in
the same direction for all substances. For example, individuals with a higher level of
education are more likely to drink alcohol but less likely to smoke cigarettes. Relative
to marijuana, the quality of the product matters in a positive way. Finally, substance
use is less likely the higher are the prices. When we control for joint use (last three
columns), the eects of age and race on the consumption of marijuana change: if an
individual is older or white and non-hispanic, the propensity to consume marijuana is
lower. One can see that the joint use eects are all negative and signicant.
Table G.2 presents the estimate for multivariate probit regressions which allow
for correlation in the decision to consume the substances in combination and control
for persistence in behavior.1 The covariance results are consistent with those of the
previous table; moreover, we nd that it is important to take into account persistence,
whose impact remain signicant when controlling for the initial conditions (last three
columns). In general, past use increases the current probability of consuming the
substances, as expected.
1Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) also specify a random eects dynamic ordered probit model
controlling for endogeneity á la Wooldridge. In their model, the outcome variable (and thus the lagged
outcome variable) is a vector of J dummy variables for the J ` 1 possible outcomes (dropping one of
them).
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Multivariate Probits no Joint Use Multivariate Probits
Variable Alcohol Marijuana Tobacco Alcohol Marijuana Tobacco
Product Charachteristics
Marijuana Price -0.009(0.009)
-0.013
(0.022)
Alcohol Price (Beer Tax) -0.214***(0.07)
-0.131***
(0.068)
Cigarette Price (Package) -0.076***(0.198)
-123***
(0.044)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.058*(0.034)
0.112
(0.075)
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.302**(0.151)
0.683*
(0.367)
Demographics
Age 0.125***(0.008)
0.023***
(0.008)
0.102***
(0.009)
0.064***
(0.008)
-0.064***
(0.017)
0.027*
(0.015)
Male 0.263***(0.034)
0.39***
(0.034)
0.216***
(0.037)
-0.028
(0.032)
0.078
(0.072)
-0.042
(0.067)
White Non-Hispanic 0.576***(0.036)
0.347***
(0.036)
0.491***
(0.04)
0.191***
(0.034)
-0.351***
(0.08)
0.091
(0.071)
Health Quality (1 to 5) -0.1***(0.0184)
-0.129***
(0.018)
-0.24***
(0.02)
0.071***
(0.018)
0.048
(0.038)
0.005
(0.034)
Married -0.446***(0.06)
-0.73***
(0.072)
-0.23***
(0.069)
-0.039
(0.055)
-0.138
(0.168)
0.17
(0.113)
Max education: High School 0.255***(0.057)
-0.305***
(0.058)
-0.82***
(0.059)
0.614***
(0.07)
-0.294***
(0.102)
-0.756***
(0.08)
Max education: University 0.55***(0.075)
-0.531***
(0.075)
-1.59***
(0.085)
1.026***
(0.08)
-0.652***
(0.177)
-1.44***
(0.18)
Max Parents Education: High School -0.082***(0.04)
-0.004
(0.04)
0.39***
(0.046)
-0.123***
(0.038)
0.143
(0.091)
0.257***
(0.084)
Parents Education: University or more 0.23***(0.057)
0.056
(0.054)
-0.11*
(0.067)
0.187***
(0.05)
0.115
(0.449)
-0.651***
(0.211)
Joint Use Eects
Smoke Cigarettes and Use Marijuana -2.09***(0.037)
Drink and Use Marijuana -1.07***(0.02)
Drink and Smoke Cigarettes -1.46***(0.023)
Number of obs: 6,440. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All specications include year xed eects and a constant.
***p<0.01, **p<0.5, *p<0.1.
Table G.1.: Multivariate Probit Regressions
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MV Probits MV Probits Initial Cond
Variable Alcohol Marijuana Tobacco Alcohol Marijuana Tobacco
Lagged Use
Marijuana Use Last Period 0.297***(0.099)
0.169*
(0.101)
Alcohol Use Last Period 0.0506***(0.041)
0.595***
(0.053)
Smoker Last Period 0.957***(0.103)
0.773***
(0.14)
Product Charachteristics
Marijuana Price -0.023(0.03)
-0.017
(0.032)
Alcohol Price (Beer Tax) -0.037(0.078)
-0.06
(0.078)
Cigarette Price (Package) -0.086(0.056)
-0.089
(0.057)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.109(0.097)
0.085
(0.102)
Ratio High Quality Marijuana 0.88*(0.51)
0.88
(0.59)
Demographics
Age -0.0074(0.01)
-0.073***
(0.023)
0.0355
(0.024)
-0.023
(0.022)
-0.01
(0.06)
0.031
(0.048)
Male -0.051(0.037)
0.091
(0.092)
-0.108
(0.09)
-0.047
(0.038)
0.083
(0.098)
-0.113
(0.09)
White Non-Hispanic 0.115***(0.04)
-0.325***
(0.104)
-0.153
(0.099)
0.1**
(0.04)
-0.31***
(0.109)
-0.142
(0.103
Health Quality (1 to 5) 0.07***(0.02)
0.031
(0.047)
0.0364
(0.046)
-0.012
(0.032)
0.051
(0.74)
0.07
(0.067)
Married 0.012(0.058)
-0.106
(0.188)
0.199
(0.136)
0.008
(0.058)
-0.058
(0.201)
0.205
(0.137)
Max education: High School 0.573***(0.085)
-0.443***
(0.123)
-0.565***
(0.108)
-0.212
(0.2)
-0.504
(0.38)
0.05
(0.26)
Max education: University 0.965***(0.092)
-0.705***
(0.187)
-1.07***
(0.205)
-0.069
(0.218)
-0.53
(0.475)
0.094
(0.408)
Max Parents Education: High School -0.147***(0.043)
-0.328**
(0.128)
0.057
(0.111)
-0.124***
(0.044)
0.355***
(0.135)
0.027
(0.113)
Parents Education: University or more 0.163***(0.057)
0.207
(0.17)
-1.02***
(0.37)
0.164***
(0.057)
0.23
(0.18)
-1.02***
(0.37)
Joint Use Eects
Smoke Cigarettes and Use Marijuana -2.09***(0.044)
-2.09***
(0.44)
Drink and Use Marijuana -1.05***(0.023)
-1.56***
(0.023)
Drink and Smoke Cigarettes -1.39***(0.027)
-1.39***
(0.027)
Number of obs: 4,486 (individuals interviewed in one year only are dropped from the sample). Standard errors in
parenthesis. All specications include year xed eects and a constant. ***p<0.01, **p<0.5, *p<0.1.
The initial conditions specication includes the mean over time of all the time varying regressors.
Table G.2.: Multivariate Probit Regressions with Lags
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